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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
subject appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 
1988). This Brief Amicus Curiae is filed pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 25, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Would adoption of Utah Power & Light Company's 
(UP&L?s) interpretation of §10-2-424, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as 
amended, and its theory as to the measure of damages foster 
anti-competitive effects and further skew the competitive 
imbalance between UP&L and municipal power systems. 
2. Was §10-2-424, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, 
intended by the Utah State Legislature to be a condemnation 
statute and does it require a theory of compensation applying 
traditional eminent domain measures of damage? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Const. Art. XI, Section 5(b): 
(Cities have power) to furnish all local public 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
services, to purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain and 
operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and 
use; to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, necessary 
for any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by 
general law for protection of other communities; and to 
grant local public utility franchises and within its powers 
regulate the exercise thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-20-424: 
Whenever the electric consumers of the area being 
annexed are receiving electric utility services from 
sources other than the annexing municipality, the 
municipality may not, without the consent of the electric 
utility, furnish its electric utility services to the 
electric consumers until the municipality has reimbursed 
the electric utility company which previously provided the 
services for the fair market value of those facilities 
dedicated to provide service to the annexed area. If the 
annexing municipality and the electric utility cannot agree 
on the fair market value, it shall be determined by the 
state court having jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-7-4: 
The board of commissioners, city council or board of 
trustees of any city or town may acquire, purchase or lease 
all or any part of any water, waterworks system, water 
supply or property connected therewith, and whenever the 
governing body of a city or town shall deem it necessary 
for the public good such city or town may being 
condemnation proceedings to acquire the same; provided, 
that if within thirty days after the passage and 
publication of a resolution or ordinance for the purchase 
or lease or condemnation herein provided for one-third or 
the resident taxpayers of the city or town, as shown by the 
assessment roll, shall protest against the purchase, lease 
or condemnation proceedings contemplated, such proposed 
purchase, lease or condemnation shall be referred to a 
special election, and if confirmed by a majority vote 
thereat, shall take effect; otherwise it shall be void. In 
all condemnation proceedings the value of land affected by 
the taking must be considered in connection with the water 
or water rights taken for the purpose of supplying the city 
or town or the inhabitants thereof with water. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-34-1: 
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Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right 
of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the 
following public uses: 
( i ) 
(2) 
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of any 
county, city or incorporated town, or board of education; 
reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes 
for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any 
county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of 
any county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the 
banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and 
widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, 
streets and alleys; and all other public uses for the 
benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the 
inhabitants thereof. 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric 
power lines, and sites for electric light and power plants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 Nature of the case, course of the proceeding and 
the disposition below. 
On April 17, 1989, Utah Associated Municipal Power 
Systems (UAMPS) petitioned this Court for Leave to File an 
Amicus Curiae Brief. The Motion was predicated upon the fact 
that this Court should be apprised of the concerns expressed by 
the Federal Energy Regulator respecting certain 
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anti-competitive practices by UP&L and the effect that a 
decision by this Court adopting UP&Lfs theory of damages would 
have on the ability of municipal power agencies to compete with 
UP&L respecting the servicing of newly annexed residents with 
electrical utility services. Additionally, the Motion also 
sought to address some of the issues respecting the measure of 
damages which were not addressed in the Logan City Brief. 
On April 18, 1989 this Court granted UAMPS* Motion and 
the time for filing of the Amicus Brief was subsequently 
enlarged to and including May 25, 1989. 
UAMPS adopts the statement of the case as set forth in 
the Brief of Logan City but recognizes the fact that UP&L 
disputes Logan's view that ownership of UP&L distribution 
facilities are not a central issue in the case. UAMPS takes no 
position with respect to which is the correct interpretation. 
2 Statement of Facts 
UAMPS adopts Logans statement of facts as set forth in 
its brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. For this Court to adopt UP&LTs interpretations of 
§10-2-424, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, (hereinafter §424) 
and its theories of the measure of damages, would be 
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anti-competitive and, frustrate or foreclose the ability of 
municipalities to serve annexed residents. 
2. Section 424 was never intended by the Utah State 
Legislature as a condemnation statute. It was only intended to 
fairly compensate a utility previously servicing annexed areas 
for its "dedicated facilities" which were providing service to 
the annexed areas. UP&L's theory of damages either as to its 
measure of market value or in the nature of condemnation are 
contrary to legislative intent and not required by §424. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TO ADOPT UTAH POWER & LIGHT'S INTERPRETATION OF 
§ 10-2-424 AND ITS THEORY OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
WOULD BE ANTI-COMPETITIVE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE OR 
FORECLOSE THE ABILITY OF MUNICIPALITIES TO SERVE 
ANNEXED RESIDENTS. 
UAMPS' members include Beaver, Blanding, Bountiful, 
Brigham City, Enterprise, Ephraim, Fairview, Fillmore, Beaver 
Light & Power, Holden, Hurricane, Hyrum, Kanosh, Kaysville, 
Lehi, Meadow, Monroe, Morgan, Mt. Pleasant, Murray, Oak City, 
Parowan, Payson, Price, Santa Clara, St. George, Spring City, 
Springville, Strawberry Electric Service District, and 
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Washington. UAMPS1 members have cooperatively organized in 
order to secure reliable, economic sources of electric power 
for their residents. 
As may be expected, the relationship between UP&L and 
the public power agencies in Utah, including the members of 
UAMPS has not always been salubrious. UAMPS1 members firmly 
believe that local control and accountability assures better 
and more economic service. There is also considerable pride in 
the autonomy represented by municipally owned and operated 
utilities. 
Municipal power systems serve an important function by 
providing "yardstick" competition with investor-owned 
utilities. Although the Utah Public Service Commission is 
intended to be a substitute for free market competition, there 
is still the need for benchmarks against which the 
reasonableness of investor owned utility rates may be measured. 
The residents of areas annexed by municipalities which 
own and operate their own electric distribution systems should 
have the right to consider, among other things, the advantages 
available of service from the municipal utilities. The 
position advanced by UP&L in this case would tend to restrict 
or eliminate the choices the citizens may have by making it 
much more difficult for the annexing municipality to provide 
those services. 
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Regulatory Commission ("FERC") made a number of findings with 
regard to the historical anti-competitive behavior of UP&L. 
Utah Power & Light Company, PacifiCorp, PC/UP&L Merging 
Corporation, Opinion No. 318, 45 FERC II 61095 (Oct. 26, 1988), 
modified, Opinion No. 318-A 47 FERC U 61 (May 12, 1989) 
(hereinafter "Opinion No. 318"). A copy of the FERC opinion is 
attached hereto as Appendix A. 
In Opinion No. 318, the FERC affirmed the findings of 
the FERC Administrative Law Judge with regard to UP&Lfs 
anti-competitive behavior both before and after the merger. 
The FERC expressly found that the proposed merger "would likely 
substantially lessen competition and tend to create a 
monopoly." (Opinion No. 318 at p. 14.) One of the findings 
made by the FERC was that UP&L had "consistently refused to 
permit the wheeling of low-cost power across its system in 
order to use its strategically located bottleneck to extract 
monopoly prices." (Opinion No. 318 at p. 33.) 
The FERC imposed certain conditions which, if 
satisfied by the merged company, would ameliorate such 
anti-competitive behavior. These conditions include certain 
obligations to provide wheeling to transmission-dependent 
utilities such as the members of UAMPS. 
The relevance of the FERC Opinion in this proceeding 
is simply to indicate that UP&L has historically occupied a 
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less expensive and can guarantee local control as to rates and 
service. The right to be served, and reciprocally the right to 
serve, should not be abrogated nor impeded by artificially high 
damage theories. 
If the practical effect of adopting UP&I/s damage 
measure is to foreclose the ability of an annexed resident to 
be served by an annexing municipality, or conversely, to make 
it financially impossible for the annexing municipality to 
serve its new residents, then not only may it offend the 
constitution of Utah but would foster the anti-competitive 
effects identified by the FERC. 
In the case before the Court Logan has offered 
$117,000 to compensate UP&L for the value of its local 
facilities. UP&L counters, arguing that the measure of damages 
equates to $434,987 dollars ($343,568 according to the 
alternative condemnation evaluation). The territory annexed to 
Logan included fifty five customers who generated a total of 
$77,000 gross billings per year. 
Logan argues that adopting UP&L's measure of damages 
would amount to a practical foreclosure of its constitutional 
right to service its customers pursuant to Article XI, §5(b) 
Utah Constitution. UAMPS would submit that even adopting 
UP&L's alternate and less expensive damage measure may have the 
same effect. Testimony in the District Court established that 
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Additionally, this case arises at a time when the 
recent merger will provide huge economic advantages to UP&L . 
Notwithstanding the terms and conditions imposed by the FERC, 
municipal utilities and other public power agencies will be 
hard-pressed to remain competitive in such a climate all to 
the advantage of UP&L. 
UAMPS urges this Court to be mindful of the far 
reaching effect that an excessive measure of damage will have 
not just to Logan City but to the public power systems in 
Utah. Such a ruling would frustrate the vitality so necessary 
for public power systems to continue to serve their customers 
reliably and economically. 
Logan has made a reasonable offer to compensate UP&L 
for its facilities which have heretofore serviced the annexed 
territory. The District Court agreed and rejected the UP&L 
position. Its position to compensate only the dedicated local 
facilities and a pro rata amount for partially dedicated 
facilities is consistant with legislative intent and is fair in 
all respects. Logan's position with respect to the measure of 
damages is not only reasonable but allows the city to service 
and the customers to be serviced and enhances market place 
competition. 
II. §10-2-424, UTAH CODE ANN., 1953 AS AMENDED, IS 
NOT, NOR WAS IT EVER INTENDED, AS A CONDEMNATION STATUTE NOR 
DOES IT REQUIRE COMPENSATION APPLYING TRADITIONAL EMINENT 
DOMAIN THEORY. 
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condemn an existing and operating power system by eminent 
domain. CP National Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 638 
P.2d 519 (Utah 1981) 
In discussing sections of the Utah Code which confer 
the right of condemnation and define the powers of 
municipalities this Court concluded that: 
"No. . . express statutory authority exists for 
municipalities to condemn a power system.ff at 523 
Furthermore, the Court construed the relevant portions 
of §78-34-1 Utah Code Ann., 1953 as authorizing the 
condemnation of real property not already constructed 
facilities. In so concluding the Court held: 
"The taking of an ongoing public utility business 
is more than the taking of real or even tangible 
personal properties and is therefore. . . not 
contemplated within the meaning of §78-34-1(3)." 
at 523 
The Court also limited the provisions of §78-34-1(8) 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, which authorize the condemnation of 
"electric light and electric power lines and sites for electric 
light and power plants," to the lines and sites for a power 
plant. 
Having thus concluded that the exercise of eminent 
domain was not available to municipalities to authorize the 
condemnation of operating electric power systems, the Court 
finalized its conclusions with a statement important to the 
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considerations herein presented; 
n
'Hid the legislature intended *• t^ai.t i 
reasonable tha* it w-uld h. ve done s 
expressly in si 78- ;'* - 1(8 » or elsewhere as it aid 
in the case of water works svsfems i p Hr% " . 
:24 
was i : / . ; n a e u ,r . • .. . ,. . .> ia i jrt- when . . cruaci e c P-+2-* r 
n e e d t * ^ r t o .. : e g i s l a t i v e d . r e c t i c n a s * ;t- r e s p e c n v ^ 
u t i i r . i < , , j j " t a u ; i e i \ i i , j i i t Liiubt ai- ; iexed a r e a s was 
p e r s u a s i v e ] - •.:: < : , * .^? : aw r e v i e w a r t i c l e CP N a t i o n a l 
L ^ 1~ p . . - . * U w j . _^ v- C/li 1" V 1 1 1 L ^ 111*111 S b i y h . m c j u n o u i L L i u u d i 
Ambiguity Surrounding Municipal Systems, 1982 Uta- * ~ ^ ^ 
Accordinr I v , the- ' tah Legislnt ive foo^ r ^be 
domain siauiu
 s .,;- Legislature .Jeait vsith the .; 1! ie- ' . ~->~ 
1'"'. chanter J o: *~he Code winch o^ -i- . renera1 '• ^ - " r ' u-
o:her\sise, w 8 - >M 1 couia easily nave been amended i clarify 
the prop Wrm identJti^d PV * -*- r( - -t r Jr_ Nat_i anal , L^pn? 
1 ^. • ~r the lesLislarur* 
have aacied i f; u: .mended 1 . r 1 e :f\ Chapter > v:tii i e : c : ru„ 
Code m specifically provide for "condemnation" had that been 
t . 
The floor debate, referenced extensively b% " ')th ""?*L 
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and Logan in their respective Briefs is indicative of 
legislative intent. In the 1985 Senate debates on the 
amendments to §424 an interesting dialogue is engaged in by the 
sponsor. Senator Sowards and Senators Bangerter, Matheson, 
Hillyard, Barton and Bunnell. A portion of that dialogue was 
referenced in Logan's Brief but reproduced herein for total 
context: 
Senator Matheson: 
Then Senator, then suppose now that whoever the 
utility you're going to purchase from don't want 
to sell. Now this bill gives you the right to 
negotiate with them for an arms-length sal^, I 
suppose. But does it give you the right of 
condemn, er, of eminent domain. It ought to just 
automatically take that over without a court 
proceeding if they won't negotiate in good faith. 
Senator Bangerter: 
I think on the eminent domain system, I had 
better get some help. What about some eminent 
domain, counselor? 
Senator Hillyard: 
I expect that they probably could file an eminent 
domain for a public right. I would have to look 
up that specific question, but, cities, number 
one, do have the power of eminent domain, but its 
only for what they do, the purpose, right, uh, 
their public right. But if they do, then they 
pay what the court or the jury determines to be a 
fair market value. And I don't think there is 
any different way of negotiating what an 
arbitrator would decide. 
Senator Matheson: 
That's correct. But under this bill, now suppose 
they don't want to negotiate like you've said 
here for fair market value and they don't want to 
sell. Now are you going to let them, under this 
bill, require that you give it to them? Is that 
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:,! • -or approach to eminent domain, is : he 
;-:t St l^n " ' • isking? 
Senator Hillyard: 
Well, I don't think its a back door approach, I 
think that the city has the power of eminent 
domain. How they exercise it is the question 
Senator Mathesom 
Not without going to court 
Senator Hj^ lJLvard: 
Thatf s right". 
Senator Matheson; 
Are you granting that powei to them i low to take 
this without going to court ui ider the process of 
e m i II e n t domain? 
Senator Hillyard: 
No No 
Senator Matheson: 
If they don't want to s• B] 1 \ 
Unidentified: 
I think you wouiu uc- u^k 11 11o coui t i f ;; \ : > \ • :ai : f 1: 
agree to a figure on eminent domain. 
Senator BangerLCI . 
Mr. President. I think, this bi i , , tih, in answer 
to Senator Matheson, I think that citizens as 
they annex, they have the constitutional right to 
have the same kind of services because they pay 
the same kind of taxes. And whether in the court 
process that that has to happen through eminent 
domain, I think that, my opinion, would be that 
that woti 1 d be up t o the c ourt s . 
President: 
Senator Barton. 
Senator Barton: 
I think on page 2, line 6, the question is 
stated. While starting on line 5, it says 
the annexing municipality and the electric 
utility cannot agree on the fair market 
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reimbursement value, it shall be determined by 
the state court having jurisdiction." So that 
doesn't even speak to eminent domain, uh, the 
court will decide. 
Senator Bangerter: 
That's correct. That's the way I understand it, 
too. 
Senator Bunnell: 
I think that what this says is if you annex and 
you're getting power from UP&L, they have a right 
to serve you until the city reimburses you for 
the fair value, 1 mean reimburses the utility. 
Now, if you can't agree on the fair value, then 
they have to go to court, but if the city offers 
them like $50,000.00, if that's the fair value, 
they have to take it. They would have to prove 
it in court if they couldn't agree. So the 
penalty is that these people will stay on UP&L 
until the deal is made. On the other side, it 
forces the utility and the municipality to make a 
deal. If they don't, they have to go to court. 
Senator Bangerter: 
I think that's correct. 
While there appears to be some confusion as to the 
means of compensation. Senator Barton nicely summerizes the 
purpose and intent of the bill. 
Logan is absolutely correct in its assertion that §424 
was enacted in part to encourage "good faith negotiation." 
Senator Sowards, in his final statement before the vote to 
reconsider action of the bill in 1983 stated in response to a 
similar observation from Senator Bangerter: 
"That's why were passing the bill^ to get away 
from litigation." 
There is never a hint that the legislative scheme was 
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intended to generate the "trappings" of a full blown 
condemnation proceeding. It was simply a good faith attempt to 
find a fair method of balancing the right of annexing 
municipalities to serve their new residents and to "fairly, not 
extravagantly," reimburse the previously servicing utility. It 
is an attempt, admittedly not a perfect one, to encourage 
settlement and to avoid the acrimony that almost always attends 
condemnation litigation. 
UAMPS concedes that UP&L is entitled to compensation 
for its "facilities dedicated to provide service to annexed 
areas." The basis for the measure of damage, however, is 
defined by the language of the bill itself. Again the 
legislative hearings are an indication of what was intended. 
Senator Sowards, the original sponsor of the 1983 version of 
§424, explained that the purpose of the bill "is to provide 
that electric utilities are fairly paid for their facilities 
and equipment in areas that they are servicing when they are 
annexed by a municipality with a power system of its own." 
Additionally, it is obvious from a reading of the 
legislative hearings and particularly of Senator Sowards' 
testimony, that he was sponsoring House Bill 354 (the eventual 
§424) in the Senate on behalf of UP&L and was being advised by 
counsel for UP&L. It must thus be assumed that the sponsor, 
with the concurrence of the bills major proponent, were 
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comfortable with the language of their legislative initiative. 
Although §424 was further amended to remove 
restrictions relative to existing franchise rights, there is no 
suggestion in any of the hearings or the later amendments that 
compensation was to be paid for anything other than "facilities 
and equipment." UP&L now argues that §424 requires 
compensation for "severance damage, going concern value and the 
value of its franchise rights." It cites for authority 
numerous cases which it asserts support its position respecting 
damages. Although, these cases involve municipal annexation, 
each case involves the application of specific condemnation 
statutes setting forth the method by which the city attempted 
to take over the property of a private utility. Relying upon 
such case authority, UP&L argues that the only logical and 
constitutional interpretation of §424 is that it requires 
compensation for not only its local facilities, but a share of 
UP&L system assets, including generation, substations, 
franchising and going concern values. It presents a neat, 
seemingly definitive percentage calculation as to the portion 
of its system "dedicated" to the servicing of the fifty five 
annexed residents and calculates the fair market of all such 
damage. 
Although not conceding that this matter involves 
condemnation, prominent commentators have discussed the 
-21-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
difficulty in determining "standards of compensation in utility 
condemnation." Quoting case law it has been said: 
"The standard of compensation in utility 
condemnation is an extremely vague one, and 
although many tests are considered none seems to 
be controlling. No rigid measure can be 
prescribed for the determination of "just 
compensation under all circumstances and in all 
cases." No hard fast rule can be laid down that 
will cover every case nor fix in advance the 
limit of the matters that may be taken into 
consideration in any particular case. Various 
tests have been employed, alone and in 
combination. The usual method of fixing the 
value of property for taking is by ascertaining 
market value. There is hardly a market, in the 
usual sense, for a public utility, particularly 
the regulated utility. We must, therefore, turn 
to other tests of value. What we use is largely 
a matter of judgment and circumstance, 
(emphasis added) 4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent 
Domain, §15.4(1), citing, Onondaga County Water 
Authority v. New York Water Service Corp. 285 
App. Div. 655, 139 N.Y.S. 2d 255 
UAMPS submits that this is precisely the test that 
should be applied herein and in the future when §424 becomes 
applicable. Because of the unique circumstances that exist in 
Utah respecting the economic and competitive advantages 
historically enjoyed by UP&L and now even more evidenced by the 
recent merger, this Court should judge this appeal in view of 
those realities. 
The District Court in this case has made an award 
which fairly compensates UP&L for its "dedicated and partially 
dedicated transmission facilities. UP&L no longer will have 
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the beneficial use of these facilities (whether it retains 
title or not) and it should be compensated. 
The valuation of these facilities is reasonably 
susceptible to objective determination. It is difficult to 
understand, however, how the loss of fifty-five residential 
customers will have an adverse economic impact on UP&L/s 
system, particularly where many times that number of customers 
are added to the system each week. With the huge economic and 
competitive advantages enjoyed by UP&L it should not be granted 
''windfall damages'1 at the expense of the few small 
municipalities who seek only to service newly acquired 
residents desiring the municipal utility services. 
CONCLUSION 
UAMPS joins with Logan City in submitting that the 
judgment of the District Court be affirmed. 
UAMPS has suggested herein that the over-riding public 
policy concerns expressed by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission should be given great deference by this Court in 
reviewing this matter on appeal. UP&L has advanced a theory of 
damages which if granted will substantially interfere with the 
rights of municipalities to service its annexed customers with 
electric utility services. Furthermore, while the legislature 
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was certainly concerned about fairness in reimbursement of a 
utility which had previously serviced an annexed territory, 
it was also concerned about fairness to the municipality with 
the hope that when such annexations occur, reimbursement could 
be facilitated through a reasonable negotiation process. The 
Legislature could never have intended a result which would so 
substantially enhance the already competitive market advantage 
enjoyed by UP&L. 
It is therefore respectively submitted that the award 
of reimbursement to UP&L by the District Court was reasonable 
and that the same should be affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this 25the day of May, 1989. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
1 JLL. 
Johi^  T. Nielsei 
eirneys for Amicus Curiae outh Main Street, Suite 1600 . Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
Before Commissioners: Martha 0, Hesse, Chairman; 
Charles G. Stalon and Charles A. Trabandt. 
Utah Power & Light Company ) 
PacifiCorp ) Docket No. EC88-2-000 
PC/UP&L Mergi r ic:j Corporation ) 
OPINION NO. 318 
OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, MODIFYING IN PART, 
AND REVERSING IN PART INITIAL DECISION AND 
CONDITIONALLY APPROVING MERGER 
(Issued October 26, 1988) 
I. Background 
On October 5, 1987, Utah Power & Light (UP&L), PacifiCorp 
(PacifiCorp Maine) and PC/UP&L Merging Corporation (PacifiCorp 
Oregon) (collectively referred to as Applicants) filed a joint 
application under section 203 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) 1/ 
seeking approval of a proposed merger. 
Pursuant to an agreement and plan of reorganization and 
merger (merger agreement), the Applicants propose to merge 
PacifiCorp Maine and UP&L into PacifiCorp Oregon (to be renamed 
PacifiCorp upon completion of the merger) with PacifiCorp Oregon 
to be the surviving corporation. 2 ' 
A. The Parties to the Proposed Merger 
1. Utah Power & Light Company 
UP&L is engaged principally in the business of generating 
and selling electric energy in Utah, southeastern Idaho and 
southwestern Wyoming. UPiL's electric service area of 
approximately 90,000 square miles contains approximately 510,000 
retail customers. UP&L serves Salt Lake City, West Valley, and 
Ogden, Utah and over 400 other cities and towns at retail and 
serves numerous municipalities and electric associations at 
1/ 16 U.S.C. § 824b (1982). 
2/ The merger agreement provides that the capital stock of 
UP&L and PacifiCorp Maine shall be converted into 
shares of the capital stock of PacifiCorp Oregon. 
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wholesale. The company also sells surplus power and energy to 
other utilities. The Applicants state that PacifiCorp Oregon 
will conduct the same general business when the transaction is 
consummated., under the assumed business name of Utah Power & 
Light Company. 
UP&L's transmission system is comprised of 7,788 miles of 
transmission lines. The company utilizes its facilities 
generally to supply electric services within its service area and 
to sell electric energy at wholesale pursuant to contracts and 
rate schedules on file with the Commission. The company also 
uses its transmission lines to transmit electric energy in 
interstate commerce. 
UP&L is interconnected by high-voltage transmission lines to 
IB adjacent major power systems. UP&L is a member of the 
Northwest Power Pool and is a party to the Intercompany Pool 
Agreement with seven Northwest utilities. UP&L is also connected 
to other power pools within the region of the Western Systems 
Coordinating Council. 
2. PacifiCorp Maine 
PacifiCorp Maine ic a diversified corporation doing business 
as Pacific Power & Light Company (PP&L). PP&L is engaged in 
generating and selling electric energy in California, Idaho, 
Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. PP&L's electric 
service area of approximately 63,000 square miles contains 
approximately 670,000 retail customers. PP&L serves over 240 
cities and towns at retail and wholesale. The company sells 
surplus power and energy to other utilities. The Applicants 
state that PacifiCorp Oregon will conduct the same general 
business when the transaction is consummated, under the assumed 
business name of Pacific Power & Light Company. 
PP&L owns and operates approximately 20,600 miles of 
transmission lines and is interconnected with the systems of 
other utilities in California, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and 
Wyoming. PP&L is also a member of the Northwest Power Pool and 
is a party to the Intercompany Pool Agreement with seven 
Northwest utilities. It is interconnected with UP&L at UP&Lfs 
Naughton Plant near Kemmerer, Wyoming. PP&L sells electric 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce and transmits electric 
energy in interstate commerce. 
PacifiCorp Oregon 
PacifiCorp Oregon was incorporated for the purpose of 
effectuating the proposed merger. Upon approval of the merger, 
PacifiCorp Oregon would provide electric service to more than 
1,180,000 retail customers throughout California, Idaho, Mont2-
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Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Its electric service 
territory would aggregate approximately 153,000 square miles. 
B. The Applicants Statement with Regard to the Public 
Interest 
The Applicants state that the proposed merger will promote 
the public interest and benefit customers of UP&L and PP&L by 
integrating the electric utility properties now separately owned 
and operated. 3/ They argue that because PP&L is a winter-
peaking utility and UP&L is a summer-peaking utility, the 
consolidation will provide opportunities for more efficient use 
of power resources. This, they assert, will enhance the 
reliability of service and postpone the need for costly addition 
of resources and will enhance prospects of wholesale power sales 
to the southwestern United States. 4/ 
The Applicants anticipate that the consolidation of 
resources and operations and the economies of scale derived from 
the merger will allow the elimination of overlapping functions 
and result in future operating savings. Future operating savings 
are also expected through the consolidation of inventories, 
increased flexibility in scheduling maintenance of generation 
plants, and shared services between the operation divisions. 5/ 
The Applicants further assert that the merger would present 
an opportunity for increased operation efficiencies by virtue of 
existing generating capacity, technical expertise and other 
resources. PP&L currently obtains approximately 30 percent of 
its power from hydroelectric generation and the remainder through 
coal-fired generation. UP&L currently generates 92 percent of 
its electricity at coal-fired plants and owns several coal 
properties. The Applicants expect that the availability of 
PP&L's surplus power may also enable the UP&L division to delay 
construction of a new power plant, thereby deferring, and 
possibly eliminating, costly construction expenditures. The 
Applicants also expect that the benefits to be obtained will help 
to stabilize rates and result in the development of a less 
expensive and more efficient electrical system. 6/ 
Finally, the Applicants state that PacifiCorp Oregon, as the 
surviving corporation, will ba both larger and financially 
2/ Joint Application for Authorization for a Merger, filed 
October 5, 1987 at 10-12-
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stronger than either company operating separately. Accordingly, 
the Applicants assert that the merged company will be in a 
stronger position to finance the acquisition or construction of 
facilities on more advantageous terms. 2/ 
C State Proceedings 
Proceedings have been conducted by the state commissions in 
Arizona, California, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming. Each of these state commissions has granted approval of 
the proposed merger. 
D. The Cpmmjssjpn's Hearing Qrder 
On December 12, 1987, the Commission set for expedited 
hearing various issues with regard to the proposed merger. 8/ 
2/ Id-
8/ Utah Power & Light Co., fit 2l*, 41 FERC 1 61,283 
(1987). The following parties sought and were granted 
intervention in this proceeding: AMAX Magnesium 
Corporation (AMAX); Citizens Energy Corporation; 
Colorado River Energy Distributers Association (CREDA); 
Deseret Generation & Transmission Corporation (Deseret 
G&T); Idaho Power Company and Montana Power Company; 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 
American Public Power Association, Mid-West Electric 
Consumers Association, Inc., Great Lakes Electric 
Consumers Association, Northwest Public Power 
Association, Southwestern Power Resources Association, 
Southeastern Power Resources Committee, and Idaho 
Cooperative Utilities Association (collectively 
referred to as NRECA/APPA, g£ al.); the Nucor Steel 
Division of Nucor Corporation (Nucor Steel); Public 
Power Council; Sierra Pacific Power Company (Sierra 
Pacific); Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems 
(UAMPS) and Washington City, Utah; United Mine Workers 
of America, International Union, Environmental Action, 
Salt Lake Citizens Congress and Salt Lake Area 
Community Program (collectively referred to as United 
Mine Workers, g£ alO' Utah Division of Public 
Utilities; Utility Shareholders Association of Utah 
(Shareholder Association); The Washington Water Power 
Company; Arizona Public Service Company; Nevada Power 
Company; San Diego Gas & Electric Company; Pacific Gas 
and Electric Company; Southern California Edison 
Company; South Dakota Public Utilities Commission; 
Montana Public Service Commission; the Public Service 
Commission of the State of Wyoming; Rogue Valley Fair 
(continued-..) 
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These issues include the effect of the proposed merger on rates, 
the effect of the merger on the competitive situation, and the 
effect of the merger on the ability of this Commission and the 
various state commissions to regulate the merged entity. 
We also set for hearing the issue of whether the merged 
companies will be capable of being operated economically and 
efficiently as a single entity, as well as the impact on the 
public interest of the merged entity not operating as a single 
entity to the extent such is found to be the case. 9/ 
E. The Judge's Initial Decision 
On June 13, 1988, the presiding administrative law judge 
issued an Initial Decision finding that the Applicants have 
failed to show that the proposed merger is consistent with the 
public interest. 10/ The judge found that: (1) the Applicants 
have not demonstrated that the benefits of the merger would 
outweigh its costs; 11/ (2) the proposed merger would tend to 
substantially lessen competition and create a monopoly; 12/ and 
(3) the Applicants1 proposed structure, ratemaking, and 
allocation methodologies would adversely affect the ability of 
this Commission and the state commissions to regulate the merged 
entity. 12/ 
£/(.•.continued) 
Share; and the Public Utilities Commission of the State 
of California. On February 19, 1988, Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company filed a notice of withdrawal pursuant 
to Rule 216 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.216 (1988). Similarly, on 
February 22, 1988, Southern California Edison Company 
filed a notice of withdrawal. 
9/ 41 FERC at 61,75?. 
10/ Utah Power & Light Co., et al., 43 FERC J 63,030 
(1988) . 
11/ Id. at 65,335. 
12/ Id. at 65,359. 
13/ Id. In addition to the findings of fact set forth in 
the text of the Initial Decision, the judge set forth 
ninety-one (91) "Further Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law." 43 FERC.at 65,354-59. Unless 
specifically referred to in this opinion, no inference 
should be drawn that we either affirm or reverse such find. 
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The judge also found that the various conditions proposed by 
the parties would not render the merger consistent with the 
public interest. 14/ Moreover, he found that the Commission 
lacks the authority to impose such conditions. Thus, the judge 
found that the application for approval of the merger should be 
denied. 
F. Briefs on Exception to the Judge's Initial Decision 
On June 27, 1988, Briefs on Exception to the judge's Initial 
Decision were filed by the following parties: the Applicants; 
trial staff; Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems; Sierra 
Pacific and Nevada Power Company; Washington Water Power Company; 
Nucor Steel; AMAX; the Public Service Commission of Wyoming; the 
Utah Division of Public Utilities; the Shareholder Association; 
and CREDA. 15/ 
In their Brief on Exceptions, the Applicants state that they 
except to almost every conclusion contained in the discussion 
section of the Initial Decision, as well as to almost every 
finding contained in the section of the Initial Decision entitled 
Further Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 16/ They argue 
that the judge erred in the Initial Decision in applying an 
incorrect standard in determining whether the proposed merger is 
consistent with the public interest; in concluding that the 
merger is likely to lessen competition in any relevant market; in 
dismissing the Applicants' proposed wheeling policy without 
appropriate consideration; in concluding that the costs of the 
merger outweigh its benefits; and in rejecting benefits on the 
grounds that they are achievable by contract. 17/ 
The Applicants further contend that the judge erred in 
requiring that a method for allocating costs between the 
divisions be established prior to the merger; in determining that 
the impact of the merger on customers' rates cannot be 
determined; in finding that the merger may have a significant 
impact on interruptible rates; in concluding that the impact on 
the Bonneville Power Administration's rates cannot be determined 
14/ Id. at 65,354. 
15/ CREDA's Brief on Exceptions sets forth what it terms 
"minor factual corrections" to the Initial Decision. 
CREDA's Brief on Exceptions at 1. In lieu of a Brief 
on Exceptions, the Public Power Counsel and the 
Northwest Public Power Association filed a joint 
statement of counsel raising no substantive issues. 
16/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 7. 
17/ i£. at 7-8. 
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and that rates of other utilities may be adversely affected; in 
holding that operation as a single coordinated entity is 
constrained; in holding that shareholders should not share in the 
benefits of the merger; in finding that PacifiCorp Maine's 
diversified operations will have a significant impact on 
investors1 risk perceptions of the merged company; and in 
determining that the merger will impair effective regulation of 
the merged company. 18/ 
Trial staff argues that the judge erred in finding that the 
costs of the merger would not be offset by the benefits of the 
merger; in interpreting the Commission order setting this matter 
for hearing as requiring cost of service data from the 
Applicants; in finding that the Applicants' rate proposals should 
have been more definitive than they were; in not considering 
trial staff's proposal for correcting the rate problems; in 
finding that it would not be possible to effectively regulate the 
merged company; in finding that trial staff and intervenors were 
denied a reasonable opportunity to comment on the Applicants1 
proposed wheeling policy; in concluding that the Commission lacks 
authority to impose wheeling conditions in approving a merger; 
and in failing to consider trial staff's proposed wheeling 
policy. 12/ 
Trial staff also argues that the Initial Decision 
incorrectly decides several issues that are significant to the 
future exercise of the Commission's authority. Specifically, 
trial staff argues that the Initial Decision: (1) sets forth an 
incorrect standard for determining whether the benefits of a 
merger exceed its cost; (2) applies an overly stringent standard 
for demonstrating future rate impact; (3) incorrectly finds an 
absence of authority to impose conditions necessary to remedy 
defects in a merger application; and (4) erroneously rejects 
effective proposals that would successfully address the 
development of appropriate future rates and certain adverse 
effects on competition that would otherwise be produced by the 
merger. 20/ 
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems excepts to the 
Initial Decision to the extent that it finds that the 
Commission's authority to condition its approval of mergers under 
section 203 of FPA does not include the authority to require 
conditions relating to wheeling access or to require any other 
condition that is not strictly related to: (1) maintaining 
adequate service or coordinating the Applicants' facilities; and 
18/ Id. 
19/ Trial staff Brief on Exceptions at 6-7. 
20/ Id. at 7-8. 
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(2) fine-tuning otherwise acceptable merger proposals that 
already satisfy the statutory public interest standards. 21/ 
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems also excepts to the 
Initial Decision's failure to consider the wheeling policy as 
proposed by trial staff and others. They further except to the 
judge's failure to consider the alleged discriminatory effects of 
the merger on existing wheeling rates. 22/ 
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems contends that policy 
considerations warrant Commission review of the Initial Decision. 
They point out that this is the first case involving a merger of 
this magnitude to come before the Commission under section 203 of 
the FPA. Thus, they argue that this case is of unusual 
significance to the electric utility industry and to the public. 
They also argue that the Initial Decision includes rulings that 
would sharply limit the Commission's authority to impose 
conditions on future mergers or acquisitions under section 203. 
Finally, they argue that since issues involving transmission 
pricing and access are central to this proceeding, the 
Commission's decision regarding those issues may have broad 
implications for the electric industry and its regulators. 23/ 
Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company except to the 
judge's failure to rule that in the event the merger is approved: 
(1) the Applicants' divisional pricing proposal should be 
rejected; (2) the post-merger wholesale fuel clause should be 
based on all fuel clause costs of the merged company; and (3) the 
merged company should be required to make an immediate rate 
filing. 
Washington Water Power Company excepts to the judge's 
finding that opportunity cost pricing is premised on the absence 
of competition and leads to double recovery because an 
appropriate level of profit is already included in embedded 
costs. 24/ It also excepts to the judgefs finding that profits 
obtained from brokering power sales are monopoly profits since 
they are based on value of service, and not on cost of 
service. 25/ Washington Water Power Company states that these 
findings do not adequately take into account the nature and 
21/ Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems Brief on 
Exceptions at 8. 
22J Id. at 8-9. 
23/ Id. at 9-10. 
24/ Washington Water Power Company Brief on Exceptions at 2. 
2 5/ Id. 
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guality of wholesale power transactions that may occur among 
utilities, absent monopolistic intent or conduct. 26/ 
The Utah Division of Public Utilities excepts to the judgefs 
finding that the Applicants failed to show that there are 
substantial benefits to be achieved by the merger as well as to 
the finding that the merger should be denied because the merger 
benefits could be achieved by contract. 27/ It also excepts to 
the judge's concern for interruptible customers whose rates and 
service come under the jurisdiction of the Utah Public Service 
Commission. 2SJ Finally, the Utah Division of Public Utilities 
excepts to the judge's conclusion that the merger would impair 
the ability of regulators to effectively regulate the merged 
entity. 29/ 
The Public Service Commission of Wyoming excepts to the 
judge's finding that regulation by state commissions would be 
impaired by virtue of the size and varied operations of the 
merged company. 30/ It argues that after an initial adjustment 
period, regulation of the new entity poses no significant or 
novel regulatory difficulties. 31/ Thus, the Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming states that it fully supports the merger 
and requests that the decision of the judge be overturned and the 
merger approved. 32/ 
AMAX excepts to the judge's finding that the Commission 
lacks broad authority to condition a merger. 33/ It argues that 
the merger should be approved so long as its proposed conditions 
regarding interruptible customers are adopted, and the Commission 
finds that the merger is otherwise consistent with the public 
interest. 34/ 
26/ Id. at 3. 
27/ Utah Division of Public Utilities Brief on Exceptions 
at 3. 
28/ Id. 
29/ Id. 
30/ Public Service Commission of Wyoming Brief on 
Exceptions at 2. 
11/ Id. at 5-6. 
32/ Id. 
33/ AMAX Magnesium Corporation Brief on Exceptions at 6. 
34/ Id. 
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Nucor Steel excepts to the judge's construction of section 
203 of the FPA as being devoid of implicit authority to fashion 
conditions necessary and appropriate to assure that an otherwise 
unacceptable merger becomes consistent with the public interest. 
It also excepts to the judge's determination that conditions 
removing or overcoming restrictions embodied in the Applicants1 
wheeling policies are not necessary or appropriate to secure the 
maintenance of adequate service and the coordination in the 
public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, as set forth in section 203(b). 36/ Finally, Nucor 
Steel excepts to the judgefs failure to consider its proposed 
conditions aimed at preventing degradation of service to UP&L's 
interruptible customers. 37/ 
The Shareholder Association excepts to the judge's finding 
that transmission service is a relevant market for purposes of 
evaluating the effect of the merger on competition. 38/ 
Similarly, it excepts to the judge's finding that UP&L controls 
essential facilities and that the merged company would exercise 
undue market power. 39/ Finally, it excepts to the judge's 
ruling excluding the testimony of its witness. 40/ 
G. Briefs Opposing Exceptions 
On July 11, 1988, Briefs Opposing Exceptions were filed by 
the following parties: the Applicants; trial staff; the United 
Mine Workers, fit flJL.; Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company; 
Deseret G&T; Nucor Steel; AMAX; Utah Associated Municipal Power 
Systems; the Public Power Council and Northwest Public Power 
Association; NRECA/APPA, si al.; and CREDA. 
35/ Nucor Steel Brief on Exceptions at 3. Pursuant to Rule 
711(a)(1)(iii), 18 C.F.R. § 385.711 (1988), Sierra 
Pacific and Nevada Power Company incorporate by 
reference this sime exception to the judge's Initial 
Decision. Brief of Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power 
Company on Exceptions, filed July 11, 1988. 
3j5/ Id. 
12/ Id. 
38/ Utility Shareholder Association of Utah Brief on 
Exceptions at 5. 
39/ Id. 
40/ Id. at 4-5. 
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The Applicants oppose the exceptions taken by trial staff, 
the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, and Nucor Steel with 
respect to the Commission's authority to require wheeling as a 
condition on approval of the merger. However, the Applicants 
state that the wheeling policy proposed by trial staff is 
acceptable to them, and Applicants will not interpose any 
objection if that wheeling policy is required as a condition on 
approval of the merger. 41/ 
The Applicants also oppose the exceptions taken by trial 
staff, the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, Sierra 
Pacific, Washington Water Power Company, Nucor Steel, and AMAX 
with respect to their proposals to modify the Applicants' 
proposed wheeling policy and to impose rate conditions on 
approval of the merger. 42/ 
Trial staff opposes the exceptions taken by the Applicants 
with respect to the judge's finding that: (1) the merger would 
have an adverse effect on competition; (2) the costs of the 
merger would outweigh its quantifiable benefits; (3) certain 
alleged benefits of the merger should be rejected on the grounds 
that they are achievable by contract; (4) a method for allocating 
costs between the divisions should be established prior to the 
merger; and (5) the impact on the Bonneville Power 
Administration's (BPA) rates cannot be determined and that rates 
of other utilities may be adversely affected by the merger. 43/ 
Trial staff also opposes Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power 
Company's exception to the judge's failure to rule that the 
Applicants' post-merger jurisdictional rates must be based on 
rolled-in costing and that the post-merger wholesale fuel 
adjustment clause must be based on all fuel clause costs of the 
merger company. 44/ 
Finally, trial staff opposes Utah Associated Municipal Power 
Systems' exception to the Initial Decision's failure to consider 
potential discriminatory effects of the merger on existing 
wheeling rates. 45/ Trial staff argues that any proposed 
41/ Applicants Brief Opposing Exceptions at 2-4. 
12/ Id-
43/ Trial staff Brief Opposing Exceptions at 1-2. 
44/ Id. at 2. 
15/ Id. 
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increase in the wheeling rates of the merged company can be 
opposed at the time such a rate filing is made. 46/ 
The United Mine Workers, fit ai. oppose virtually all of the 
exceptions taken by the Applicants, trial staff, 47/ the Public 
Service Commission of Wyoming, the Utah Division of Public 
Utilities, the Utility Shareholder Association of Utah, and the 
Washington Water Power Company. 48/ They also oppose Utah 
Associated Municipal Power Systems1 exception to the judge's 
failure to consider the wheeling policy proposed by trial staff 
and others. 
CREDA opposes virtually all of the exceptions taken by the 
Applicants, 49/ trial staff, the Utility Shareholders Association 
of Utah, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, 50/ and the 
Utah Division of Public Utilities. 51/ CREDA also opposes the 
exceptions taken by Nucor Steel and AMAX with respect to the 
judge's finding that the Commission has only narrow authority to 
condition the merger. 
46/ I£. at 58-9. 
47/ The United Mine Workers, g£ al. do not oppose trial 
staff's exception to the judge's refusal to consider 
trial staff's proposal of having the merged company 
file future rate filings and allocation plans at 
definite times. Similarly, they do not oppose trial 
staff's exception to the judge's conclusion that the 
Commission lacks the authority to impose wheeling 
conditions in approving the merger. 
48/ United Mine Workers, gt ai. Brief Opposing Exceptions 
at ix. 
49/ CREDA does not oppose the Applicants' exception to the 
judge's ruling that the merger may have a significant 
impact on interruptible rates, that the impact on the 
Bonneville Power Administration's rates cannot be 
determined, and that the rates of other utilities may 
be adversely affected. 
50/ CREDA does not oppose Utah Associated Municipal Power 
Systems' exception to the judge's failure to consider 
the discriminatory effects of the merger on existing 
wheeling rates. 
51/ CREDA does not oppose the Utah Division of Public 
Utilities' exception to the judge's concern for 
interruptible customers whose rates and service fall 
under its jurisdiction. 
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NRECA/APPA, gt ai. oppose each of the exceptions taken by 
the Applicants and trial staff. 52/ However, their brief 
addresses only those exceptions relating to the effect of the 
merger on competition. 
The Public Power Council and Northwest Public Power 
Association oppose many of the exceptions taken by the 
Applicants, trial staff, the Utility Shareholder Association of 
Utah, the Utah Division of Public Utilities, and the Public 
Service Commission of Wyoming. 53/ However, their brief 
addresses only those exceptions relating to the effect of the 
proposed merger on competition and on the effectiveness of 
regulation. 54/ Moreover, they adopt and support the positions 
taken by NRECA/APPA, fit al. (except as to the imposition of 
conditions and the appropriateness of opportunity cost pricing), 
as well as the position taken by CREDA relating to costs and 
benefits of the merger and the need for cost of service 
information. 55/ 
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems opposes the 
Applicants1 exceptions to the judge's finding that the merger is 
likely to lessen competition in a relevant market. 56/ Utah 
Associated Power Systems, as well as AMAX, also oppose the 
Applicants' exception to the judge's dismissal of the Applicants' 
wheeling policy. 57/ 
Deseret G&T opposes the exceptions taken by Applicants 
insofar as Applicants argue that their proposed wheeling policy 
is equivalent to trial staff's, is supported by Deseret G&T, or 
offers adequate assurance of transmission access by transmission 
dependent utilities. 58/ 
Nucor Steel opposes virtually all of the exceptions taken by 
52/ NRECA/APPA, g£ &!• Brief Opposing Exceptions at 1. 
53/ Public Power Council and Northwest Public Power 
Association Brief Opposing Exceptions at 1, 10-15. 
54/ Id. at 4. 
55/ Id. at 4-5. 
56/ Utah Associated Power Systems Brief Opposing Exceptions 
at 2. 
57/ UAMPS Brief Opposing Exceptions at 2; AMAX Brief 
Opposing Exceptions at l. 
58/ Deseret G&T Brief Opposing Exceptions at 2. 
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the Applicants and trial staff. 52/ It also opposes the 
exceptions taken by: (1) the Public Service Commission of Wyoming 
with respect to the effectiveness of regulation; (2) UAMPS with 
respect to the Applicants' proposed wheeling policy; (3) the Utah 
Division of Public Utilities with respect to the claimed benefits 
of the merger and the effect on interruptible customers; and (4) 
the Washington Water Power Company with respect to opportunity 
cost pricing. 60/ 
Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company oppose the 
Applicants' exception to the judge's rejection of claimed 
benefits to the merger on the grounds that they are achievable by 
contract. 61/ Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company also 
oppose the Applicants' exception to the judge's finding regarding 
shareholders' rights to share in the benefits of the merger, 62/ 
and his finding that the merger would impair effective federal or 
state regulation of the merged company. 63/ Finally, Sierra 
Pacific and Nevada Power Company oppose trial staff's exception 
with respect to the judge's rejection of staff's proposal to 
require future rate filings to correct rate problems associated 
with the merger. 64/ 
As discussed below, we affirm the presiding judge with 
respect to his finding that the proposed merger would likely 
substantially lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly. 
We also affirm the judge with respect to his finding that the 
proposed merger could adversely effect the ability of this 
Commission and the state commissions to effectively regulate the 
merged entity. Thus, we find that as a result of the likely 
adverse effect on competition and on the effectiveness of 
regulation, the proposed merger is not consistent with the public 
interest. 
However, we reverse the judge with respect to his finding 
that the Commission lacks the authority to adequately condition 
the proposed merger. We find that there are certain terms and 
conditions under which the proposed merger would be consistent 
with the public interest and, moreover, that we have the 
59/ Nucor Steel Brief Opposing Exceptions at 2. 
60/ Id. 
61/ Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company Brief Opposing 
Exceptions at 1. 
62/ Id. 
63/ Id. 
64/ Id. 
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authority to impose such conditions. Thus, we shall 
conditionally approve the proposed merger, subject to the 
Applicants1 acceptance of the terms and conditions set forth 
below. 
II. Procedural Motions 
A. Motion t? StriKq 
On July 7, 1988, the Public Power Council and Northwest 
Public Power Association filed a motion to strike portions of the 
Shareholder Association's Brief on Exceptions. They argue that 
the Brief on Exceptions raises issues out of time regarding the 
judge's decision to strike the testimony of the Shareholder 
Association's witness, 65/ and that major portions of the brief 
rely solely upon the stricken testimony and contain no citations 
to the record in this proceeding. They contend that the 
Shareholder Association should have sought Commission review of 
the judge's decision to strike the testimony through an 
interlocutory appeal. 66/ They further argue that by attempting 
to bring the stricken testimony before the Commission at this 
stage of the proceedings, the Shareholder Association is 
attempting to deprive the parties of their right to due process, 
including the right to cross-examine the witness. 67/ 
On July 19, 1988, the Shareholder Association filed an 
answer to the motion, arguing that evidentiary rulings lack the 
requisite "extraordinary circumstances'1 necessary for an 
interlocutory appeal. In support of its argument, the 
Shareholder Association cites Trans Alaska Pipeline System. 68/ 
where the Commission refused to certify an appeal regarding an 
evidentiary ruling made by the presiding judge. The Shareholder 
Association also argues that since its witness was unavailable at 
hearing due to the judge's ruling (and through no fault of its 
own) there is no denial of due process. 
We find that to admit the testimony of the Shareholder 
Association witness at this stage of the proceedings would 
infringe upon the right of the intervenors to due process. It 
would be unfair to overrule the judge and consider the testimony 
65/ Order Granting Motion to Exclude Testimony, issued 
February 25, 1988. 
66/ 18 C.F.R. § 385.715 (1988). 
67/ On July 11, 1988, CREDA filed an answer in support of 
the Public Power Council\Northwest Public Power 
Association's motion. 
68/ 23 FERC J 61,102 (1983). 
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of a witness not subject to cross-examination, particularly where 
the sponsoring party made no attempt to promptly appeal the 
judge's ruling. The Shareholder Association's delay in bringing 
this issue before the Commission effectively denies the 
intervenors any opportunity to cross-examine the witness, or to 
offer rebuttal testimony. 
The Shareholder Association's delay is not excused by its 
reliance on our ruling in Traps AlasKa Pipeline System. That 
case involved a request for a ruling on evidence prior to its 
submittal. Thus, it dealt with an issue of when evidence was 
properly introduced, not whether it was admissable. Moreover, 
trie Commission stated in that case that it would entertain an 
interlocutory appeal on evidentiary issues upon a showing of 
abuse of discretion by the presiding judge. This, in effect, is 
what the Shareholder Association is alleging in arguing that the 
judge improperly excluded its witness' testimony. 
Thus, we will disregard the portions of the Shareholder 
Association's Brief on Exceptions which rely on the testimony 
stricken by the judge. We will also disregard the attachment to 
the Brief on Exceptions containing the excluded testimony. 
B. Applicants' Request for Rejection of Briefs on 
Exception 
In their Brief Opposing Exceptions, the Applicants argue 
that the Brief on Exceptions of Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power 
Company should be rejected as an attempt to buttress the 
conclusions of the presiding judge since the brief agrees with 
substantial portions of the Initial Decision. 69/ On July 14, 
1988, Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company filed an answer to 
the Applicants' request for rejection, arguing that only a small 
portion of the brief focused on the presiding judge's findings, 
and, moreover, that the Applicants could not be prejudiced by 
support for the Initial Decision in the Brief on Exceptions since 
the Applicants then had the opportunity to criticize those 
arguments in the Applicants' Brief on Exceptions. 
We agree that the statements in the Brief on Exceptions of 
Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company that support the Initial 
Decision constitute only a small portion of that brief. We also 
agree that the Applicants are not prejudiced by such statements 
since they had the opportunity to (and, in fact, did) respond to 
those statements. Thus, the Applicants' request for rejection 
will be denied. 
The Applicants also argue that the Brief on Exceptions of 
AMAX should be disregarded since it: (1) contained a copy of 
69/ Applicants Brief Opposing Exceptions at 14. 
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AMAX's Initial Brief to the presiding judge; (2) failed to 
include a numbered list of exceptions; and (3) contains no 
citations to the record and relies on purported statements of 
fact not fend in the record. 7£/ On July 21, 1988, AMAX filed a 
motion for waiver of the Commission's regulations, or, in the 
alternative, for leave to file a revised brief on exceptions 
(attached to the motion). Since AMAXfs revised Brief on 
Exceptions presents no arguments not already raised in its 
original Brief on Exceptions (thus, no party will be prejudiced 
by allowing its substitution), and since the revised Brief on 
Exceptions now conforms to the Commission's regulations, we will 
grant AMAX's request to substitute its revised brief. 
C. MPtJon Requesting 0^1 Argument 
On July 11, 1988, Nucor Steel filed a motion pursuant to 
Rule 711(c) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
18 C.F.R. § 385.711(c) (1988), requesting oral argument before 
the Commission. Nucor Steel argues that briefs alone would not 
do justice to this case given its importance and the divergent 
views expressed by the various parties. However, we find that 
oral argument is unnecessary since the views of the parties have 
been stated clearly and comprehensively in their briefs on and 
opposing exceptions. Thus, Nucor Steel's motion will be denied. 
D. Post-Hearing Motion to Intervene 
On October 13, 1988, the Public Utilities Authority for the 
Town of Plymouth, Utah (the Authority) filed an untimely motion 
to intervene. It states that it is a municipality as defined in 
section 3(7) of the FPA, 71/ created on August 23, 1988 to 
provide retail electric service to local residential, commercial, 
and industrial customers (including Nucor Steel). The Authority 
states that no other participant in this proceeding can 
adequately protect its interests as a municipal electric system 
and purchaser of transmission service and electricity at 
wholesale. 
On October 21, 1988, the Applicants filed an answer to the 
Authorityfs motion. The Applicants contend that at this stage of 
the proceeding, the late motion would result in additional 
burdens on the existing parties. They also contend that the 
Authority1s interests are adequately represented by Nucor Steel. 
Given that the Authority was not created until recently, v.c 
find that it had good cause not to seek intervention earlier. 
Moreover, the Authority is a potential competitor of the merged 
70/ Id. at 21-22. 
71/ 16 U.S.C § 796(7) (1982). 
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company, unlike Nucor Steel which is a retail customer. Thus, we 
shall grant the Authority's motion to intervene out of time. 
However, we shall require that the Authority take the record as 
is, so as not to prejudice or burden any of the existing parties, 
or to delay these proceedings. 72/ 
in. Discussion 
A. The Statutory Standard Under Section 203 of the FPA 
Pursuant to section 203(a) of the FPA, a merger is to be 
approved if the Commission finds that it "will be consistent with 
the public interest." 73/ Under section 203(b), the Commission 
may grant any application "upon such terms and conditions as it 
finds necessary or appropriate to secure the maintenance of 
adequate service and proper coordination in the public interest 
of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission." 74/ 
As we noted in our order setting this matter for hearing, 
the Applicants need not show that a positive benefit to the 
public will result. 25/ Rather, the Applicants are required to 
fully disclose all material facts and carry the burden of showing 
affirmatively that the merger is compatible with the public 
interest. 76/ 
In Commonwealth Edison Company, et al. (Commonwealth!, 77/ 
the Commission set forth the following non-exclusive list of 
factors that it would consider when determining whether a 
proposed merger is in the public interest: 
(1) the effect of the proposed action on the 
Applicants' operating costs and rate levels; 
(2) the contemplated accounting treatment; 
72/ See, e.g. Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et 
ai*, 31 FERC 1 61,041 (1935). 
7 3/ 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a) (1982). 
74/ 16 U.S.C. § 824b(b) (1982). 
75/ 41 FERC at 61,752, citing Pacific Power & Light Co. v. 
F.P.C., 111 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 1940). 
76/ I£. 
77/ 36 FPC 927 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Utility Users League 
v. FPC, 394 F. 2d 16 (7th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 393 
U.S. 953 (1968). 
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(3) the reasonableness of the purchase price; 
(4) whether the acquiring utility has 
coerced the to-be-acquired utility into 
acceptance of the merger; 
(5) the effect of the proposed merger on the 
existing competitive situation; and 
(6) whether the consolidation will impair 
effective regulation either by this 
Commission or the appropriate state 
regulatory authority. 78/ 
In its order setting this matter for hearing, the Commission 
found that there was no need to set for hearing factors "2", "3", 
and "4M. We found that: (1) the accounting treatment applied by 
the Applicants is in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles and the Uniform System of Accounts; (2) 
there were no allegations made and no evidence submitted that the 
merger was brought about by coercion; and (3) there was no 
showing that the purchase price was not reasonable. 79/ Thus, we 
set for hearing those issues that relate to the remaining 
enumerated factors. 
Some intervenors had suggested that in addition to the 
factors enumerated in Commonwealth, the Applicants must be held 
to the "single integrated public utility-system" standard 
contained in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
(PUHCA). 80/ However, in our order setting this matter for 
78/ 36 FPC at 932. 
79/ 41 FERC at 61,755. 
80/ 15 U.S.C. § 79j(c)(2) (1982). An "integrated public 
utility-system11 is defined as 
a system consisting of one or more units of 
generating plants and/or transmission lines 
and/or distributing facilities, whose utility 
assets, whether owned by one or more electric 
utility companies, are physically 
interconnected or capable of physical 
interconnection and which under normal 
conditions may be economically operated as a 
single interconnected and coordinated system 
confined in its operations to a single area 
or region, in one or more States, not so 
large as to impair (considering the state of 
(continued...) 
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hearing we stated that lfwe need not strictly apply the provisions 
of PUHCA • . . . Our focus must be on the impact on the public 
interest of the merged entity's operation." £1/ Thus, as noted 
above, we set for hearing the issue of whether the merged 
companies will be capable of being operated economically and 
efficiently as a single entity, as well as the impact on the 
public interest of the merged entity not operating as a single 
entity to the extent such is found to be the case. 82/ 
B. The Commission's Authority to Condition a Merger 
As noted, the Commission has the authority to deny approval 
of a merger if it is not "consistent with the public interest.11 
It follows, therefore, that if the Commission can deny approval 
of the proposed merger, it must also be able to take the less 
restrictive step of conditioning its approval; the power to 
condition approval is fairly subsumed within the broader power to 
disapprove. 83/ If we were to simply deny approval of the 
merger, the Applicants could then file a new application 
satisfying our concerns. Conditioning approval in the first 
instance achieves precisely the same result. In either case, the 
Applicants can pursue the merger consistent with the terms 
specified by the Commission or, if they choose, forgo the merger. 
Thus, conditioning the merger so as to make it consistent with 
the public interest represents no extension of the Commission's 
authority. 
Citing Central Maine Power Co., fii al. (Central Maine), 84/ 
80/(...continued) 
the art and the area or region affected) the 
advantages of localized management, efficient 
operation and the effectiveness of 
regulation. . . • 
15 U.S.C. § 79(a)(29)(A) (1982). 
81/ 41 FERC at 61,753. 
82/ Id. 
83/ Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 158 
(D.C. Cir. 1967). In that case, the court examined the 
Commission's authority to conditionally license a 
hydroelectric project under Part I of the FPA. The 
court stated that the provisions of the FPA imply broad 
Commission authority and that the FPA is not to be read 
to require justification of each action by reference to 
express statutory authorization. Id. 
84 55 FPC 2477 (1976). 
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the judge found that the Commissions statutory authority to 
condition a merger is narrower than its broad power to determine 
whether the merger itself is consistent with the public interest. 
We disagree. In Central Maine, the Federal Power Commission 
found that it was "clearly empowered to reject a merger proposal 
which is inconsistent with the public interest," but that its 
"authority to modify the merger agreement itself is limited to 
circumstances where conditions are necessary to ensure 
reliability and system coordination." 86/ However, the 
Commission found in that case that (even absent conditions) there 
had been no showing that the proposed merger was inconsistent 
wi,th the public interest. Thus, Central Maine stands only for 
the proposition that the Commission's authority to condition a 
merger that has been shown to be consistent with the public 
interest under section 203(a) is limited to the authority 
explicitly conferred by section 203(b). Since we find, as 
discussed below, that the proposed merger is not consistent with 
the public interest absent conditions, the statement in Central 
Maine cited by the judge is inapplicable to this proceeding. 
Citing Citv of Paris v. Kentucky Utilities Co. (City of 
Paris). 87/ and Union Electric Co.. 88/ the judge found that the 
Commission lacks the authority to order wheeling access as a 
condition on its approval of the proposed merger. However, these 
cases are inapposite to the instant proceeding. The Commission 
merely stated in City of Paris that it lacked the authority to 
order wheeling under section 202 of the FPA. 89/ That case did 
not involve a merger proposal under section 203 that was found to 
be inconsistent with the public interest. Similarly, although 
Union Electric Co. involved a proposed merger where the 
Commission refused to order wheeling, the requested wheeling 
conditions were not "relevant to the merits of the merger 
application" and thus were not necessary to remedy any adverse 
effects of the merger. 90/ Accordingly, the Commission's 
authority to order wheeling to remedy the anticompetitive effects 
of a merger was not at issue in either case. 
8 5/ 43 FERC at 65,354. 
86/ 55 FPC at 2484. 
87/ 41 FPC 45 (1969). 
88/ 25 FERC J 61,394 (1983). 
89/ 16 U.S.C. § 824a (1982). Section 202 deals primarily 
with the Commission's authority to encourage and/or 
order the interconnection of electric facilities. 
90/ 25 FERC at 61,875. 
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Similarly, the judge1s reliance on Otter Tail Power Co. v. 
U.S. rotter Tail) 21/ is misplaced. In Qtt$r Tail, the Court 
found that a District Court order requiring wheeling to correct 
anticompetitive practices did not conflict with the authority or 
the Federal Power Commission since no authority was granted under 
Part II of the Federal Power Act to order wheeling. 93/ However, 
Otter Tail simply construed the Commission's power to order 
interconnections under section 202 of the FPA as not carrying 
with it mandatory wheeling authority. It did not address, much 
less decide, how far the Commission's authority extends in 
proceedings brought under section 203 to remedy the 
anticompetitive effects of a merger. 
The judge found that Richmond Power & Light Co. v. FERC 
(Richmond) £3/ prevents the Commission from ordering wheeling in 
this proceeding since "[w]hat the Commission is prohibited from 
doing directly it may not achieve by indirection." 94/ In 
Richmond, the Commission refused to condition its acceptance of 
rates for voluntary, temporary wheeling on an agreement by the 
utilities to provide continued (involuntary) wheeling. The court 
affirmed the Commission's decision, finding that "[i]f Congress 
had intended that utilities could inadvertently bootstrap 
themselves into common-carrier status by filing rates for 
voluntary service, it would not have bothered to reject mandatory 
wheeling in favor of . . . voluntary wheeling." 95/ 
Thus, a Commission order requiring wheeling, without more, 
is impermissible since it would impose common-carrier status on 
the wheeling utility. In this case, however, the requirement 
that the merged company wheel power is based on our finding of 
likely anticompetitive effects of the merger. Accordingly (and 
as distinguished from the Richmond case), a requirement that it 
wheel power for competitors in order to ameliorate the likely 
anticompetitive effects of the merger would not serve to make the 
merged company a common-carrier. Thus, the Commission is not 
doing indirectly (making the merged company a common carrier) 
what it is prohibited from doing directly. 
91/ 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
92/ The Federal Power Act was later amended to include 
certain authority to order wheeling. 16 U.S.C. §§ 
824i-k (1982). 
93/ 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
94/ 43 FERC at 65,354 citing 574 F.2d at 620. 
9 5/ 574 F.2d at 620. 
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The Applicants cite, inter alia. New York State fllectric & 
Gas Corp. v. FERC (NYSgg) and Florida Power and Light Co, v. FERC 
(Florida) 96/ as limiting the Commission's authority to order 
wheeling in this proceeding. In NYSEG, the Court vacated a 
Commission order issued under section 206 of the FPA that would 
have resulted in an expansion of NYSEG1s voluntarily commitment 
to wheel power. The court concluded that electric utilities are 
not common carriers under the FPA and that the Commission's 
powers to regulate transmission contracts pursuant to section 2 06 
does not permit the Commission to expand a utility's commitment 
to wheel. Thus, the issue before the court was whether, under 
section 206, the Commission could expand a voluntary commitment 
to wheel without complying with the statutory prerequisites of 
sections 211 and 212 of the FPA. 97/ The Commission's authority 
under section 203 to order wheeling to remedy the anticompetitive 
effects of a merger was not at issue. 
Similarly, in Florida the court found that a Commission 
order under section 205 expanding a voluntary commitment to wheel 
would impermissibly impose common carrier status on the utility. 
Again, however, the Commission's authority under section 203 to 
order wheeling to remedy the anticompetitive effects of a merger 
was not in issue. In fact, the court specifically declined to 
address the issue of "whether the Commission has authority to 
compel wheeling as a remedy for specific findings of 
anticompetitive activities or antitrust violations." 98/ 
96/ 638 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 
821; 660 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981). 
97/ 638 F.2d at 401. Under sections 211 and 212 of the 
FPA, the Commission may require one electric utility to 
provide transmission service to another utility, 
provided certain substantive and procedural 
requirements are met. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i-k (1982). 
Under these provisions, wheeling may not be ordered 
unless the Commission determines, inter alia, that 
existing competitive relationships would be reasonably 
preserved. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c). We note that sections 
211 and 212 do not provide a basis to order wheeling in 
this proceeding since, as discussed below, the 
conditions are specifically designed to ameliorate the 
merged company's market power over transmission, thus 
altering competitive relationships. 
98/ 660 F.2d at 679. We note that the cases decided under 
sections 202, 205 and/or 206 (discussed above) can be 
distinguished from this case. Under section 203, the 
Commission has primary, affirmative authority to 
determine whether a proposed merger is consistent with 
(continued...) 
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For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Commission has 
broad authority under section 203(a) to condition approval of a 
merger that would not, but for such conditions, be consistent 
with the public interest. 99/ We find that this authority 
includes the power to order wheeling for so long as such a 
condition is necessary to avoid the likely anticompetitive 
effects of a proposed merger, and the tendency of that merger to 
create a monopoly. 100/ 
In addition to the implied authority under section 203(a) of 
the FPA to condition a merger that would not otherwise be 
consistent with the public interest, our authority under section 
203(b) of the FPA includes the power to impose conditions on a 
98/(...continued) 
the public interest. In each of the other cases, there 
existed a remedy at law, without resort to the FPA, 
through which aggrieved parties could seek relief. 
99/ We note that the recent decision in South Carolina 
Public Service Authority v. FERC, No. 87-1146, slip op. 
(D.C. Cir. July 5, 1988), does not conflict with our 
authority to impose conditions in this proceeding. In 
that case, the court ruled that the Commission lacks 
the authority under Part I of the FPA to condition the 
licensing of a hydroelectric project on the licensee's 
agreement to provide compensation for all foreseeable 
property damage caused by seismically induced dam 
failure. Slip op. at 2. The court held that the FPA 
does not give the Commission the authority to displace 
existing tort law, a matter traditionally left to the 
states, with its own rules of liability for damages 
caused by licensees. The court noted that while Part I 
of the FPA requires the Commission to ensure that a 
project is safe before licensing, the protection of 
"life, health, and property," 16 U.S.C. § 803(c) 
(1982), does not equate with compensation for damage to 
property, as ordered by the Commission. Slip op. at 9. 
In this proceeding, however, the conditions imposed do 
not conflict with existing state tort law, and, 
moreover, arise under our authority under a different 
section of the FPA (section 203). Thus, the imposition 
of conditions in this proceeding does not conflict with 
the decision in South Carolina Public Service Authority 
v. FERC. 
100/ We also note that section 203(b) provides that the 
"Commission may from time to time for good cause shown 
make such orders supplemental to any order made under 
this section as it may find necessary or appropriate." 
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merger that are necessary and appropriate to secure the 
maintenance of adequate service and the coordination in the 
public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. As discussed below, we are conditioning our approval 
of this merger on the Applicants1 agreement, inter alia, that 
they wheel power for competitors under certain terms and 
conditions in order to remedy the merger's likely adverse effect 
on competition. As discussed below, if we were to approve the 
merger without such conditions, utilities that compete with the 
merged company could be denied access to the merged company's 
strategically located transmission facilities. This, in turn, 
could affect the coordination of jurisdictional facilities. 
As we"explained in Public Service Company of New Mexico, et 
al., 101/ coordination between independent utilities can be 
achieved in a variety of ways. Coordination has been 
successfully achieved through formal power pools - provided that 
membership is widely available and transmission services readily 
provided to effectuate pool transactions. Coordination can also 
be achieved through "the operation of a market, supplemented by 
reliability agreements." 102/ With the successful operation of a 
market "through a multitude of independent decisions, the actions 
of individual utilities are coordinated so that the region moves 
closer to the generation configuration that would produce 
electricity at lowest possible cost." 103/ Since no region-wide 
power pool exists within the WSCC, the strategic dominance of the 
merged company over transmission could interfere with the 
coordination of jurisdictional facilities by handicapping the 
operation of a well-functioning bulk power market. 
Accordingly, in addition to our authority under section 
203(a), we find that our authority under section 203(b) includes 
the power to impose those terms and conditions that are aimed at 
remedying the merger's likely adverse effect on competition since 
those conditions are necessary to secure the maintenance of 
adequate service and the coordination in the public interest of 
facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
The impact of the merger on coordination of jurisdictional 
facilities is an additional factor that led us to impose the 
conditions set forth below. 
C. The Effect on Competition 
1. The Commission's Responsibilities 
101/ 25 FERC 1 61,469 (1983). 
102/ 25 FERC at 62,038. 
103/ 25 FERC at 62,039. 
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In exercising its public interest responsibilities, the 
Commission must consider the policies that underlie the antitrust 
statutes. 104/ By considering antitrust and anticompetitive 
issues, the Commission serves as "a first line of defense against 
those competitive practices that might later be the subject of 
antitrust proceedings.11 105/ Thus, the Commission is obligated 
to consider possible anticompetitive consequences flowing from a 
proposed merger, and allegations of anticompetitive conduct may 
properly be raised in proceedings under section 203 of the 
FPA. 106/ 
We note, however, that the Commission is not strictly bound 
by, and not empowered to enforce, the antitrust laws; they are 
employed to give understandable content to the broad statutory 
concept of the public interest. 107/ It is our responsibility to 
make findings related to the pertinent antitrust statutes and 
weigh them along with other important public interest 
considerations. 108/ 
2. The Applicable Antitrust Statutes 
The antitrust statute that sets forth the basic legal 
standard generally applicable to mergers is Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act. 109/ It prohibits an acquisition or merger where in 
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of 
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly." 
Mergers and acquisitions may also violate the Sherman Act as 
an agreement or combination in restraint of trade (Section 1) or 
the willful acquisition or exercise of monopoly power (Section 
2). In determining whether a merger violates Clayton Act § 7 
because it tends to create a monopoly, precedent under the 
Sherman Act is relevant in considering what amounts to monopoly 
104/ Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758-60 
(1973); FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976). 
105/ 411 U.S. at 760. 
106/ 411 U.S. at 757. 
107/ Northern Natural Gas Co- v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 960 
(D.C. Cir. 1968), citing California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 
482, 490 (1962). Similarly, the Commission does not 
have jurisdiction to determine violations of the 
antitrust laws. 
108/ Id. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) . 
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power and what constitutes a significant increase in market or 
monopoly power. 110/ 
Thus, consistent with its obligation to take into account 
the policies underlying the antitrust statutes, the Commission 
directed the parties to address at hearing whether the proposed 
merger would tend to create a monopoly and whether it would be 
likely to substantially lessen competition. 111/ We also set for 
hearing the issue of whether the merged company would have 
control over facilities that are essential to participation in 
the bulk sales market. 112/ 
3. Analysis of the Effect on Competition 
As discussed below, we affirm the judge with respect to his 
finding that the proposed merger is likely to result in a 
substantial lessening of competition in the relevant product and 
geographic markets. 113/ We find that UP&L presently exercises 
monopoly power in regard to its essential transmission 
facilities. We further find that the merger of UP&L's 
transmission facilities with PP&L's generation and transmission 
facilities would enhance that ability to exercise monopoly power. 
Thus, we conclude that the potential adverse effect on 
competition that would likely result from the merger is 
inconsistent with the policies underlying the antitrust statutes. 
a. The Relevant Markets 
The first step in assessing the likely effect of a proposed 
merger on competition is to define the relevant product and 
geographic markets that will be affected. 114/ In this case, the 
relevant product markets include bulk power and transmission. 
The presiding judge correctly determined that transmission is a 
separate product market from the bulk power market since it can 
110/ Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted to enhance the 
Sherman Antitrust Act by arresting mergers that tend to 
lessen competition "in their incipiency and well before 
they have attained such effects as would justify a 
Sherman Act proceeding." S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 
2d Sess. 4-5 (1950) (quoted in Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32 (1962)). 
!?!/•41 FERC at 61,754. 
1 W Id-
113/ 43 FERC at 65,359. 
114/ United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 
U.S. 377, 391-93 (1956). 
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be sold separately and.one product cannot be substituted for the 
other. They exist at separate levels in the vertical structure 
of the electric industry. 115/ All parties addressing the issue 
agree that bulk power also constitutes a relevant product market. 
The relevant geographic market for bulk power consists of 
the geographic area covered by the member systems of the Western 
Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC) since this is the area within 
which the merging companies compete, and within which buyers can 
reasonably turn to purchase bulk power. 117/ 
The relevant geographic markets for transmission include the 
transmission paths, described below, through which the relatively 
low-cost power generated in the Northwest Power Pool Area 
(Northwest) may be delivered to markets in the Southwest 
(California, southern Nevada, and the Desert Southwest), where 
the majority of bulk power purchasers in the WSCC are 
located. 118/ Similarly, the transmission facilities connecting 
the Rocky Mountain Area of the WSCC with the Northwest constitute 
a relevant geographic market. 
Applicants argue that these transmission paths are not 
relevant geographic markets. 119/ We disagree. There are two 
significant general transmission paths through which the abundant 
low-cost power generated in the Northwest can be sold to buyers 
115/ Ex. 178 at 14; Ex. 84 at 14; Ex. 99 at 2. We note 
that, although the Applicants argue to the contrary, 
all intervenors that addressed this issue, together 
with trial staff, found transmission to be a separate 
relevant product market. Id. See also Town of Massena 
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1980-2 CCH Trade Cases 1 
63,526 at 76,798 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court found 
that generation, transmission, and distribution service 
each constitute an identifiable product market. 
116/ See, e.g.. Ex. 14 at 9-10; Ex. 178 at 15; and Ex. 84 at 
42-43. 
117/ Ex. 178 at 16; Ex. 84 at 44-46. We recognize that 
limitations on transmission access can inhibit the 
efficient functioning of that market by precluding some 
transactions from being made. However, the WSCC 
represents the overlying area within which them main 
bulk electricity competition occurs. Ex. 84 at 45-46. 
118/ Ex. 84 at 18. The Desert Southwest is comprised of the 
Arizona-New Mexico subregion of the WSCC. Id. 
119/ Applicants Brief On Exceptions at 19-23. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Docket No. EC88-2-000 -29-
in the Southwest. 120/ The concentration of potential bulk power 
purchasers in the Southwest makes access to the transmission 
facilities connecting these regions to the resource-rich 
Northwest critical to the effectiveness of competition. 121/ 
Thus, we find that these two major transmission paths connecting 
the Northwest to the Southwest are relevant geographic markets. 
Similarly, transmission capacity between the Rocky Mountain 
area and the Northwest is important to reducing power costs in 
the WSCC, since, when surplus hydroelectric power is unavailable, 
a large part of the WSCC relies on coal-fired resources from the 
Rocky Mountain area. 122/ Thus, transmission linking the two 
areas also constitutes a relevant geographic market. 
b. The Transmission Markets 
The transmission markets through which bulk power can be 
delivered to the Southwest consist of an eastern and western 
corridor. 123/ The western corridor consists primarily of the 
A.C. and D.C. Pacific Interties, which are predominantly 
controlled by BPA, while Portland General Electric Company and 
PP&L both control smaller shares. 124/ The eastern corridor 
120/ 43 FERC at 65,344; Ex. 178 at 33-34; Ex. 80 at 4. 
Utilities in the California-southern Nevada area 
aggressively seek economy energy purchases throughout 
the WSCC due to the high percentage of relatively 
expensive gas and oil fired generation in that area. 
43 FERC at 65,344; Ex. 214, Sch. 5. Hydroelectric 
resources, which have the lowest marginal operating 
costs of bulk power resources located within the WSCC, 
are heavily concentrated in the Northwest. 43 FERC at 
65,344; Ex. 15, Schs. 9, 11. There is also a 
substantial supply of low marginal cost coal-fired 
generation in the Northwest Power Pool area which is 
not committed to native load customers. Ex. 207 at 20. 
121/ 43 FERC at 65,344 and 65,358. 
122/ Ex. 211 at 19. 
113/ Id. 
124/ Id. The A.C. Pacific Intertie has a combined capacity 
of 3200 MW, of which PP&L has a 300 MW entitlement. Ex, 
80 at 7. Portland General Electric Company has an 800 
MW entitlement to the A.C. Pacific Intertie, with the 
remaining 2100 MW controlled by the BPA. Id. The D.C. 
Pacific Intartie has a capacity of 1956 MW, all of 
which is controlled by BPA. Id. at 9. In addition to 
(continued...) 
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consists of the entire east side of the WSCC transmission grid, 
although access for Northwest producers is predominantly 
controlled by UP&L and PP&L. 125/ 
By combining the transmission facilities of UP&L and PP&L, 
PacifiCorp Oregon would effectively control access by Northwest 
sellers to the Southwest through the eastern corridor. For 
access using the eastern corridor, Northwest sellers would be 
essentially limited to one of the three interconnection points at 
Mona, Glen Canyon, or Four Corners, each of which will be 
controlled by the merged company. 126/ Although PacifiCorp would 
control a smaller share of the western corridor, BPA controls the 
predominant share through its control of the Pacific Interties. 
Thus, sellers in the Northwest seeking to sell power into 
the Southwest would essentially be limited to transmission 
124/(...continued) 
the Interties, the western corridor also contains a 100 
MW capacity transmission line owned by PP&L. Thus, the 
combined capacity of the western corridor is 5256 MW, 
of which 4056 MW is controlled by BPA, 800 MW by 
Portland General Electric Company, and 400 MW by PP&L. 
125/ Ex. 178 at 34-36; Ex. 80 at 19-20. For access to the 
Southwest, the primary alternative to lines owned by 
UP&L is the Intermountain Power Project (IPP) D.C. line 
(1920 MW). However, access to the IPP line for 
Northwest sellers can effectively be obtained only 
through UP&L's Mona substation. Ex. 80 at 12. 
Therefore, UP&L effectively controls access to the IPP 
line. 
The eastern corridor also contains some low-capacity 
transmission lines owned by the Western Area Power 
Administration (WAPA) and others that do not provide 
significant access to the Southwest. Ex. 80 at 14-16. 
In addition, there are three small transmission lines 
that require transmission around UP&L's system through 
Colorado for power to be sold to the Southwest. 
However, these three lines are not economically 
feasible alternatives for most of these transactions 
since, among other reasons, wheeling charges would have 
to be paid to at least three other utilities and such 
transactions would involve substantial transmission 
line losses. Ex. 80 at 17. 
126/ Exs. 80 and 81. 
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facilities controlled by BPA or the merged company. 127/ Access 
through BPA, however, must conform to BPA's Intertie access 
policies that restrict the ability of utilities to engage in both 
firm and non-firm sales, 128/ Moreover, the Interties provide 
meaningful access only to California and not to the Desert 
Southwest. Therefore, as found by the judge, the merger would 
give the Applicants strategic dominance over transactions from 
the Northwest into the Southwest. 129/ 
The Applicants attempted to demonstrate that alternative 
transmission paths do, in fact, exist for sales into the 
Southwest. 130/ They asserted that there are three transmission 
lines that could be used to transmit power through the IPP line 
into California, thus avoiding UP&I/s control of access to that 
line through UP&L's Mona substation. 131/ However, each of these 
127/ Ex. 80 at 20. The merged company's dominance over 
transmission to the Southwest, as further described 
below, is derived from its strategic location which 
permits it to control power flows to those markets. 
Moreover, an evaluation of the concentration of 
ownership of transmission facilities (rather than 
control) leads to the same conclusion. The Applicants1 
own analysis, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), confirms that ownership of transmission capacity 
is highly concentrated pre-merger, and will be even 
more concentrated post-merger. The HHI is a measure of 
concentration of ownership in a relevant market. Under 
the 1984 Merger Guidelines of the Department of 
Justice, 2 Fed. Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 4490 (June 29, 1984), 
a merger in a highly concentrated market (i.e., with an 
HHI index exceeding 1800) will likely be challenged if 
the increase in the index exceeds 50 points. 
Applicants' own witness Landon calculated a pre-merger 
HHI of 3029 and a post-merger HHI of 3091, yielding an 
increase of 62. Ex. 213 at 34. 
128/ Ex. 80 at 20. 
129/ 4 3 FERC at 65,358. We find Idaho Power Company witness 
Durickfs analysis showing the merged company's 
dominance over transmission into the Southwest to be a 
well-reasoned and accurate assessment. Exs. 80 and 81. 
130/ Ex. 212, Sch. 3 at 2. 
131/ Tr. 3276-77. Applicants' witness Tucker also argues 
that utilities anywhere along the eastern transmission 
corridor have equal control over access to the 
Southwest because of their "mutual dependent 
(continued...) 
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alternatives is either non-existent or not feasible: one line, 
(the only direct north-south path) is owned by UP&L; the second 
line (Gonder-IPP) is presently not operable; and the third line 
(Bonanza-Mc~>a, an east-west line) involves a circuitous route 
around UP&L's system that is not economically feasible. 132/ 
There is also substantial transmission capacity connecting 
the Rocky Mountain area of the WSCC with the Northwest. As noted 
above, transmission capacity between these two areas is important 
to reducing power costs in the WSCC. PP&L controls the largest 
share of that capacity, with a 72.5 percent market share. 133/ 
UP&L controls the next largest share (15.7 percent). 134/ As a 
result of the merger, PP&L and UP&L would combine their control 
of existing transmission between the Northwest and the Rocky 
Mountain area, resulting in a combined market share of 88-.2 
percent. 135/ 
c. Foreclosure of Competition from the 
Transmission Market 
As discussed below, the record establishes that prior to the 
merger (even without the additional transmission control that 
would result from the merger) UP&Lfs transmission system 
constitutes an essential facility since: (1) UP&L's system is 
controlled by a monopolist; (2) competitors are unable to 
economically duplicate it; (3) its use has been denied to 
131/(...continued) 
relationship" which dictates that each company can not 
arbitrarily exercise control to exclude the others. Ex. 
211 at 5. However, UP&L's has admitted, as discussed 
below, that it has never provided firm wheeling to the 
major Northwest suppliers for sales into the Southwest. 
This shows that the alleged "mutual dependent 
relationship" has not prevented UP&L from foreclosing 
competitors by denying access to the Southwest at its 
interconnection points. 
132/ Tr. 3275-78; Ex. 80 at 17. 
133/ EX. 178 at 56. 
114/ Id. 
135/ Ex. 178 at 56. Thus, HHI calculations for the 
transmission market between the Rocky Mountain area and 
the Northwest Power Pool area show a pre-merger index 
of 5,643, with an increase of 2,277 points as a result 
of the merger. Ex. 178 at 46, 56. 
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competitors; and (4) it is feasible to make the facilities 
available to competitors. 136/ 
First, as demonstrated above, UP&L controls access to the 
Southwest along the eastern corridor through its three 
interconnection points at Mona, Four Corners, and Glen Canyon. 
Virtually all sales by Northwest suppliers using the eastern 
corridor must pass through one of these points. Second, it is 
not economically feasible for competitors to duplicate UP&L!s 
transmission facilities within a reasonable time due to barriers 
to entry in the construction of direct transmission paths from 
the Northwest to the Southwest. 137/ The Applicants1 own witness 
testified that he was unable to cite an instance in which a major 
transmission line was built anywhere within three years. 138/ 
Third, UP&L has exercised this monopoly control by 
foreclosing competitors from using its transmission facilities to 
sell power at UP&Lfs southern interconnections. As found by the 
judge, UP&L has consistently refused to permit the wheeling of 
low-cost power across its system in order to use its 
strategically located bottleneck to extract monopoly prices. 139/ 
136/ See MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 
v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 
1984), aff d 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
137/ Ex 178 at 66-68. These barriers include: (1) the 
combination of the great distances involved and the 
need to build to high voltages in order to obtain 
economies of scale and reduce transmission losses in 
operation; this results in high cost as well as the 
need to construct on a joint basis. I£.; (2) since the 
Federal government is the major landowner in the 
western United States, siting and environmental impacts 
requirements must be met - adding significant cost and 
delay. X&.; (3) transmission in Utah must be approved 
by the Utah Public Utility Commission. Utilities, 
other than those located in Utah, may find it difficult 
to obtain approval to construct transmission through 
Utah without UP&L's cooperation. 1^. at 68-69. UP&L 
has actively sought to prevent other utilities from 
building transmission in Utah. See NRECA/APPA Brief 
Opposing Exceptions at 71-74; and (4) it takes several 
years for entry into transmission even under 
cooperative conditions among competing utilities and 
longer under uncooperative conditions. Ex. 178 at 70. 
138/ Tr. az 3555. 
139/ 43 FERC at 65,357; Tr. 3575-76; Ex. 325. 
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Moreover, UP&L admits that it has never provided firm wheeling 
service to any major Northwest utility wishing to sell to buyers 
in the Desert Southwest, southern Nevada or California. 140/ 
Fourth, it is clearly feasible for UP&L to provide 
transmission service to competitors, since, instead of wheeling 
for its competitors, UP&L has bought the low cost, hydroelectric 
and coal power at its northern interconnection points and sold it 
at its southern interconnection points. 141/ Accordingly, we 
find that UPfrL's transmission system is presently an essential 
facility controlled by a monopolist (UP&L). 
Following the merger, PacifiCorp Oregon would control the 
essential facilities previously owned by UP&L, as well as PP&L's 
transmission facilities. As a result, PacifiCorp Oregon would 
have enhanced ability to exercise monopoly power over 
transmission in the relevant geographic markets. This increased 
control of transmission between the Northwest and the Southwest, 
as well as the Rocky Mountain area, enhances the merged company's 
ability to foreclose competition for sales of bulk power. 142/ 
d. Anticompetitive Effects 
The ability to foreclose competition can result in two 
types of anticompetitive harms. First, by refusing to wheel low-
cost power from the Northwest, the merged company could instead 
buy the power, and, in reselling it, extract monopoly profits. 
Second, the merged company could give preference to its own 
generation over that of competitors for sales into southwestern 
markets (even when the latter is cheaper). 
"The traditional starting point for determining the 
existence of monopoly power is to compare prices with incremental 
costs." 143/ By refusing to wheel power and instead engaging in 
buy/sell transactions, UP&L is able to charge a price that 
reflects more than the cost of the transmission service it 
140/ Tr. 411. 
141/ Ex. 84 at 54-55. 
142/ 43 FERC at 65,359. Moreover, if transmission lines 
presently under construction or planned in the near 
term are completed, the merged company's control over 
transmission could be further increased by connecting 
eastern and western generation. This could result in 
even further enhancement of the ability to exercise 
monopoly power. I£. at 65,358. 
143/ Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 38 FERC J 61,242 at 61,801 
(1987) . 
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provides. 144/ For example, in 1986 UP&L paid an average of 9.5 
mills for Northwest power and sold power at its Four Corners 
interconnection in the Southwest at 19 mills, a difference that 
far exceeds conventional wheeling charges. 145/ We note that 
nowhere in the record has UP&L claimed that its cost of 
transmission service supported the effective price that it was 
charging for such service. UP&L's sales of power at a price that 
is maintained at a level far exceeding its costs, coupled with 
its ownership and control over essential transmission facilities, 
demonstrates its market power to extract monopoly profits. 
In addition to its ability to engage in buy/sell 
transactions, the merged company could use its market power in 
transmission to sell PP&L's excess coal-generated capacity to 
buyers in the Southwest, displacing cheaper northern 
alternatives. PP&L's coal-generated capacity comprises 
approximately 52% of its total generating capacity, 146/ some of 
which PP&L is unable to sell. 147/ Pre-merger, PP&L was unable 
to get this power to the Southwest because it could not compete 
with cheaper alternatives for the limited transmission capacity 
available. 148/ Following the merger, the merged company will be 
144/ Ex. 84 at 54-55. 
145/ Id. In fact, in 1985 the average price for economy 
energy sales by UP&L at Four Corners was 28 to 30 mills 
before falling to 19 mills in 1986, Ma year of 
unusually low oil and gas prices.H I£. at 65. In 
contrast, marginal operating costs of the major 
Northwest suppliers were considerably less. I£. at 62-
64. For example, Montana Power Company's marginal 
generating units are coal fired, with a running cost of 
8 mills. I£. Idaho Power Company can often sell 
hydroelectric power at a negligible operating cost in 
the Spring, and it has excess coal generation at 14-15 
mills. Id. These cost differences between Northwest 
and Southwest suppliers result from the fact that about 
two-thirds of the generation in the Northwest is from 
hydroelectric facilities, and coal units supply another 
one-quarter, while more than one-half of the generation 
in the California-southern Nevada market is produced by 
more expensive gas and oil units. Ex. 214, Sch. 5. 
Ex. 8 at 13; Ex. 9, Sch. 5. 
Tr. 2473-74. 
148/ Id. As discussed above, n.136, the record indicates 
that both Montana Power Company and Idaho Power Company 
have cheaper power available with which PP&L is at a 
(continued...) 
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able to market its more expensive coal-fired generation in the 
Southwest while denying access to other sellers with less 
expensive generation. 149/ Moreover, the Applicants have 
testified that they expect to be able to sell this power as a 
result of the merger. 150/ Thus, we find that following the 
merger, there is a substantial likelihood that the merged company 
would give preference to its own bulk power, while denying access 
to competing sellers. 
The record indicates that UP&L has in the past engaged in 
inefficient transactions in order to avoid the possibility that 
seme of its generation might be excluded from rate base as not 
"used and useful." A study prepared for PP&L was used by PP&L in 
evaluating whether to pursue the merger. 151/ That study 
concludes that in light of UP&L's very large surplus of capacity 
as compared to its load, instead of using cheaper energy, UP&L is 
running generating units it otherwise would not in order to avoid 
the "used and useful" issue. 152/ The study further concludes 
that UP&L is thus incurring a higher level of cost than if UP&L 
were running its system efficiently, 153/ With the addition of 
PP&L's excess generating capacity to UP&L's excess capacity, the 
148/(...continued) 
competitive disadvantage in seeking access to the lines 
to the Southwest that UP&L controls. Ex. 84 at 62-64. 
149/ Enhanced control over transmission is not necessary to 
give the merged company the ability to displace cheaper 
alternatives with its own power. The merged company's 
ability to favor its own generation arises from the 
vertical combination of essential transmission 
facilities with PP&L's excess generation. 43 FERC at 
65,344. In contrast, the merged company's enhanced 
ability to foreclose competition, as discussed above, 
is brought about by the increase in control over 
transmission resulting from the merger. 
2473-74. 
151/ EX. 41. 
152/ I£. at 5. 
153/ Id. UP&L's ability to engage in this inefficient 
practice is further evidence of its market power over 
transmission. 
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merged company would have more reason to engage in this practice. 
154/ 
Further evidence of an incentive to the merged company to 
use its own higher-cost generation over lower-cost alternatives 
is a concern expressed by UP&L at a meeting with PP&L "that 
deregulation will put a •claim1 on their unused transmission 
unless put to firm use.11 155/ Thus, the merger would enable the 
merged company to use excess PP&L generation (which would then be 
the merged company's own generation) to avoid such a result• 
The displacement of competitors1 lower-cost generation with 
PP&L's higher-cost power is likely to produce a substantial 
adverse effect on competition and harm to consumers. Where more 
expensive generation would displace cheaper generation there will 
be a loss of economic efficiency. Generation in the Northwest 
would not be produced at the lowest cost, while the under-
utilization of cheaper sources would distort investment signals, 
resulting in less than optimal investment in those sources. 
We note that "the use of monopoly power attained in one 
market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation 
of § 2 [of the Sherman Act]. . ." 156/ We are unpersuaded by the 
merged company's assurances that it will not deny access to 
competitors in the future. We agree with the judge that the 
record is devoid of any evidence that could lead to any other 
conclusion. 157/ 
Thus, we find that even taking into account the potential 
benefits to be realized from the merger, discussed below, the 
merger as proposed is not consistent with the public interest as 
a result of its likely adverse effect on competition. 
4. Conditions to Ameliorate the Potential Adverse 
Effect; <?n Competition 
As discussed above, following the merger the merged company 
will be able to use its control over transmission to foreclose 
154/ Although UP&L is not buying all the low-cost power that 
it could, it still purchases substantial quantities. 
UP&L Form No. 1 data, 1986 and 1987. Thus, after the 
merger, PP&L's generation could displace even more of 
the available lover-cost generation. 
155/ Ex. 98. 
156/ Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 
276 (2d Cir. 1979). 
157/ 43 FERC at 65,341. 
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competition in the relevant product and geographic markets. We 
believe that the conditions set forth below are the minimum 
necessary to alleviate these likely anticompetitive effects so as 
to make the merger consistent with the public interest. 
The conditions are designed to provide a long-term remedy to 
the likely anticompetitive effects of the merger. Thus, we are 
imposing an absolute obligation on the merged company to provide 
firm wholesale transmission service at cost-based rates to any 
utility 158/ that requests such service. This long-term 
obligation is necessary to prevent the merged company from 
exercising its market power to foreclose access by competitors to 
bulk power markets in the future. 
In addition, we are imposing short-term conditions designed 
to ameliorate the exercise of monopoly power by the merged 
company during a five-year transitional period necessary until 
the long-term conditions can become effective. During the 
transition period, a portion of the merged company's transmission 
system will be set aside for use by third parties. This short-
term allocation will inhibit the merged company's ability to 
foreclose competitors who wish to use its transmission system. 
a. The Applicants' Proposed Wheeling Conditions 
The Applicants' proposed wheeling policy states, inter alia, 
that the merged company would provide firm wheeling service 
through its transmission system on a case-by-case basis. 159/ 
The Applicants state that, in general, wheeling will be allowed 
if it does not jeopardize the merged company's system or impair 
reliable service and if the merged company is allowed to price 
the service so as to recover its embedded costs plus lost 
economic benefits (opportunity costs). 160/ 
We find this policy to be inadequate. 161/ First, the 
Applicants' proposed wheeling policy is not likely to result in 
meaningful access to the merged company's transmission system. 
Moreover, nothing contained in the wheeling policy proposed by 
Applicants would prevent them from unduly preferring their own 
higher-cost generation over competitors' cheaper alternatives. 
158/ "Utilities'1 shall not include Qualifying Facilities as 
defined in section 292.101(b)(1) of the Commission's 
regulations. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(1) (1988). 
159/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 47. 
160/ Id. at 47-48. 
161/ See 43 FERC at 65,344-47. 
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Second, while opportunity cost pricing may, under certain 
conditions, provide a useful measure of the value of scarce 
transmission resources, the Applicants1 proposal for determining 
opportunity costs is overly vague and possibly unworkable. 
Further, we agree with various intervenors that opportunity cost 
pricing, as proposed by Applicants, would simply provide a 
mechanism for the merged entity to collect monopoly rents 
associated with a scarce or constrained resource (the merged 
transmission system). If allowed to retain the monopoly profits 
associated with these "congestion costs", the Applicants would 
have no incentive to alleviate the congestion. As noted by staff 
witness Mosher, 
the merging companies have definite 
incentives to withhold capacity from the 
market . . . to drive the price up, provided 
that such actions will not bring additional 
capacity into the market, or lead to 
regulatory sanctions. . . . If realistic 
alternatives are few, then congestion 
pricing, combined with the control of the 
capacity available . . . is very likely to 
result in the exercise of monopoly 
power. 162/ 
Finally, the case-by-case approach proposed by the 
Applicants for determining whether the merged company will 
provide firm wheeling will likely result in numerous Commission 
proceedings under section 206 of the FPA to determine whether 
wheeling was improperly denied. 
In contrast, the long-term obligation that we are imposing 
is designed to remedy the likely anticompetitive effects of the 
merger by requiring that competitors receive non-discriminatory 
access to the bottleneck transmission facilities of the merged 
company. Furthermore, pricing for such service will be at a 
cost-based rate. 163/ Finally, it is hoped that the long-term 
162/ Ex. 100 at 22. 
163/ "Cost-based" in not intended to suggest rates that are 
limited to embedded cost. However, we do not 
contemplate including opportunity costs in such rates, 
and in any event, opportunity cost pricing as proposed 
by Applicants will not be permitted. Where additional 
capacity is needed to meet a request, rates may be 
designed to specifically assign the cost of that 
capacity addition to the party requesting service. We 
do not preclude the possibility that such costs will 
subsequently be allocated to other beneficiaries of the 
additional capacity. 
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obligation to provide non-discriminatory transmission service 
described below will simplify and streamline the administrative 
process. 
The short-term conditions set forth a procedure to identify 
a portion of the merged company's transmission system that will 
be made available to utilities as an interim measure. The short-
term conditions are designed to remain in effect until the merged 
company is required to meet its long-term obligation to satisfy 
all bona fide firm wholesale wheeling requests. This set-aside 
and allocation approach, unlike the Applicants1 proposal, ensures 
meaningful access to competitors on the merged company's 
transmission system during the transition period. 
b. Conditions to be Imposed 
i. Transition Period Conditions 
(a). Access to Existing Capacity 
As part of its compliance filing in this proceeding, the 
merged company shall identify that portion of its total transfer 
capacity that could be used for firm deliveries by wheeling 
customers at particular points of delivery. The portion so 
identified will be designated "Remaining Existing Capacity." 
Remaining Existing Capacity shall equal the difference between 
the merged company's total transmission capacity and that 
capacity needed to serve both its native load customers and 
customers under firm contracts entered into prior to the merger 
application. After the Remaining Existing Capacity is 
identified, the merged company shall make such capacity available 
to requesting utilities as quickly as possible. 164/ 
Remaining Existing Capacity shall be divided into three 
tiers in the following percentages: Transmission Dependent 
Utilities 165/ shall have a right to 20% of the Remaining 
Existing Capacity (Tier 1); unaffiliated utilities connected to 
the merged company to the north and to the merged company's 
164/ Various intervenors have proposed setting aside some of 
the merged company's transmission capacity for use by 
others. See, e.g. United Mineworkers, e£ al. Brief 
Opposing Exceptions, Append. A. 
165/ Transmission Dependent Utilities are those utilities 
that are dependent on the merged company for 
transmission access to their load or resources, and 
includes Deseret Generation and Transmission Co-
operative, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, 
Inc. and its present members, and the present members 
of the Utah Municipal Power Association. 
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eastern division shall have a right to 30% of the Remaining 
Excess Capacity (Tier 2); and the remaining 50% of such capacity 
will be available to any utility, including the merged company 
(Tier 3). 
Within ninety days following the time the merged company 
announces that the Remaining Existing Capacity is available, 
eligible utilities shall file with the merged company all 
executed contracts which they have negotiated for firm capacity 
and energy which would utilize the Remaining Existing Capacity. 
For each respective tier, each entity announcing an executed 
contract shall be designated a Qualifying Entity11 for purposes 
of the allocation process. 
If, at the end of the ninety-day period, the transmission 
capacity required to meet the obligations under such executed 
contracts exceeds the Remaining Existing Capacity in any 
particular tier, the merged company shall allocate the Remaining 
Existing Capacity among the Qualifying Entities in proportion to 
the contract demands of the executed contracts. 
In Tier 1 and Tier 2, the allocation of transmission 
capacity to the Qualifying Entity shall continue for the length 
of the underlying contract. Regardless of the length of 
contracts in Tier 3, the allocation of capacity in that tier 
shall not exceed five years from the date the capacity becomes 
available. 166/ 
If, at the end of the ninety day period, the transmission 
capacity required to meet the obligation under such executed 
contracts is less than the Remaining Existing Capacity in Tier 1 
or Tier 2, subsequent wholesale transmission requests in such 
tier will be honored on a first-come, first-served basis. If, 
after one year, the Remaining Excess Capacity is still 
undersubscribed in Tier 1 or Tier 2, any unused capacity shall 
revert to the merged company for use in Tier 3. 
If, in Tier 3, at the end of the ninety day period, the 
transmission capacity required to meet the obligation under 
executed contracts is less than the Remaining Existing Capacity, 
then Trial Staff's revised wheeling policy 167/ with certain 
^ £CCMOVA«> W A, 0 ovO £ o i t ^ f 
166/ We recognize that some utilities may require firm 
transmission capacity for a term longer than five 
years. Pursuant to the merged company's obligation to 
serve, described below, such utilities may request that 
capacity be provided to supplement its share of 
capacity obtained through the short-term allocation. 
167/ Trial Staff's revised wheeling policy is attached 
hereto as Appendix A. 
s ts \ CK 1- rs* «* CX^KJ^S O o o W Z&{^^ 
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ehangco proposed by the Utah Associated Municipal rower Oystemj 
will apply to third party requests for wholesale transmission 
service for the remainder of the five year period. 
For the first and second tiers, the merged company shall be 
compensated for wheeling service at a rate to be determined in a 
section 205 filing following the designation of Qualifying 
Entities. For a period of five years following the effective 
date of the proposed rates, such rates shall be based on the 
merged company's embedded costs. After five years, the 
Commission may consider costing methods other than embedded cost, 
consistent with general transmission pricing policy. However, 
opportunity cost pricing as proposed by the Applicants will not 
be permitted. 
Rates in Tier 3 will also be determined in a section 205 
filing following designation of the Qualifying Entities. Those 
rates shall be cost-based, but not necessarily limited to 
embedded costs. Again, opportunity cost pricing as proposed by 
the Applicants will not be permitted. The merged company will 
make available for ratepayer relief funds it collects in excess 
of embedded cost during the transition period, with allocation of 
the excess fund to be determined in a rate case under section 
205. 
Firm wheeling would also be required within those 
"integrated service areas" as described by the Applicants 168/ 
within which they acknowledge that the merged company will be 
generally unconstrained in its ability to respond to requests to 
transmit power in the quantities that can be reasonably expected. jjSj 
When both the source and the point of delivery are within one its 
integrated service areas, the Applicants have agreed to provide 
wheeling service as a matter of course to a requesting utility 
unless the amount of power to be wheeled exceeds the engineering 
limitations of the merged company's system. To the extent 
additions to the merged company's transmission facilities are 
necessary to provide firm wheeling within an integrated service 
area and are technically feasible, the merged company shall 
construct such additions if sufficient lead time is provided and 
a contract term is agreed upon that is adequate to economically 
support the facilities required. We believe that five years is a 
1.6P/ These integrated service areas shall be subject to 
revision based upon subsequent changes to the physical 
capabilities and contractual limitations under which 
the merged company operates its transmission system. 
Thus, they shall be expanded as the merged company's 
transmission system is upgraded. 
169/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions, Appendix A. 
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reasonable length of time within which to construct these 
additional facilities. 
Any agreement regarding the transmission capacity obtained 
through the allocation process jhall not contain any provision 
restraining whatever rights exist under the FPA to re-sell or re-
assign that capacity. 
(b) Participation bv Other Utilities in 
Transmission Construction 
We are adopting the trial staff's revised conditions, 
with minor modifications proposed by the Utah Associated 
Municipal Power System's, regarding participation by third 
parties in transmission capacity additions by the merged company. 
170/ 
With respect to the construction of transmission facilities 
of voltage levels of 345 kV or higher and subject to applicable 
state regulatory approval, the merged company shall afford other 
utilities the opportunity to participate in the project, provided 
that: (a) the potential participants have a legitimate interest 
or service-related purpose in such participation, (b) the joint 
participation will not unreasonably delay the project or render 
it impractical for the merged company as a matter of economics or 
engineering, (c) the potential participants are prepared to 
equitably share in the costs and benefits of the project, 
considering the cost of the project, the value of the merged 
company's existing investment in related facilities and the 
benefits to be derived by each party, and (d) the utility 
requesting the opportunity to participate has not unreasonably 
denied the merged company's participation in comparable projects. 
With respect to Transmission Dependent Utilities, where the 
merged company initiates transmission capacity expansion, it 
shall agree to joint participation in upgrades, improvements or 
additions to backbone transmission (138 kV or higher), 
interconnections and substation facilities of the division of the 
merged company that serves them so that such utilities may, 
subject to applicable state regulatory approval, reasonably 
participate in the project, provided that: (a) the potential 
participants have a legitimate interest or service-related 
purpose in such participation, (b) the joint participation will 
not unreasonably delay the project or render it impractical for 
the merged company as a matter of economics or engineering and 
(c) the potential participants are prepared to equitably share in 
the costs and benefits of the project considering the cost of the 
70/ Utah Associated Municipal Power System Brief on 
Exceptions. 
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project, the value of the merged company's existing investment in 
related facilities and the benefits to be derived by each party. 
When requested by a Transmission Dependent Utility, the 
merged company shall not unreasonably withhold its consent for 
upgrades, improvements or additions to interconnections, 
transmission and substation facilities located within an 
Integrated Service Area, and subject to applicable state 
regulatory approval, provided that: (a) the requesting utility 
pays for the upgrades, improvements or additions, (b) the 
upgrades, improvements or additions are required to serve the 
retail or wholesale customers of the Transmission Dependent 
Utility, (c) the upgrades, improvements or additions are 
consistent with the merged company's engineering and construction 
standards, and (d) the parties are able to agree upon a fair 
allocation among them, or in the absence of such agreement, the 
requesting utility is prepared to equitably allocate the 
additional resulting transfer capability considering the cost of 
the project and the value of the merged company^ existing 
investment in related facilities. 
ii. Long-Term Obligation to Serve 
The merged company will be required to provide firm 171/ 
wholesale transmission service to any electric utility requesting 
it at a cost-based rate. The merged company will be required to 
meet all bona fide requests for service either by using its 
existing capacity or by building new facilities. The ultimate 
decision whether to build would remain with the merged company. 
In either event, the merged company will be obligated to plan and 
construct its system to accommodate all such requests. However, 
no requests for service need be fulfilled if doing so would 
interfere or disrupt the merged company's transmission 
obligations imposed during the transition period described in 
section i. above. 
The company will be required to use due diligence to meet 
all bona fide requests for service by electric utilities. We 
recognize, of course, that a reasonable period of time will be 
necessary to meet requests for which capacity must be 
constructed. Once a request for service is made, however, in r: 
event will the company be allowed more than five years to prcv:.. 
such service. We believe that five years is a reasonable maxi 
period of time for the merged company to obtain sufficient 
additional transmission capacity (by improving and upgrading t:. 
existing transmission system and/or constructing new capacity) 
satisfy all bona fide requests by other utilities for long-ter-
firm wheeling, as well as its own needs. The five-year limit 
171/ "Firm" can include off-peak service, as well as service 
that has some degree of interruptibility. 
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would begin on the date of each request, although the merged 
company would be required to use due diligence to provide the 
service sooner than five years, whenever possible. 
Following the five-year period transition period, discussed 
above, the merged company^ obligation to serve shall include a 
requirement that the merged company reduce its own off-system 
transactions 172/ to the extent necessary to meet all requests 
for transmission service by electric utilities. 
Any entity whose request is not met with due diligence (or, 
in any event, after five years) may institute a complaint 
proceeding before the Commission. A complainant must show that: 
(1) it made a request for service that has not been met; (2) it 
was willing to pay the full cost of the service; and (3) it has 
proffered sufficient security such that the merged company would 
not be at financial risk due to non-performance by the requesting 
party. Notice of the complaint will be published in the Federal 
Register, and others claiming that their requests have not been 
met will be permitted to have their complaint consolidated with 
the original proceeding. 
If a complaint is filed less than five years from the date 
of a request for transmission service, the complainant must also 
show that the merged company could have provided the service had 
the merged company used due diligence. If a complaint is filed 
five years or more from the date of the request, no showing with 
regard to due diligence will be required. Similarly, a showing 
of due diligence on the part of the merged company would not 
constitute a defense in such a case. However, no complaint 
regarding the long-term service obligation will be entertained 
during the five-year transition period. 173/ 
If a complainant shows that the merged company has failed to 
meet its service obligation, as set forth above, the merged 
company will be required to reduce its use of transmission 
capacity for off-system transactions to the extent necessary to 
172/ Off-system purchases of power needed to provide 
capacity to the merged company's native load customers, 
(including captive wholesale customers) are not subject 
to this provision. The merged company may include 
five-year projections for native load growth during the 
term of the request. Customers under firm contracts 
entered into prior to the merger agreement are also not 
subject to this provision. 
173/ Complaints regarding access to existing capacity during 
the transition period, described in section 4(b)(i) 
above, will be permitted at any time. 
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meet all requests for firm transmission service that have been 
shown to be unsatisfied• 
Any agreement regarding the transmission capacity obtained 
through the merged company^ obligation to serve shall not 
contain any provision restraining whatever rights exist under the 
FPA to re-assign that capacity. If transmission capacity is 
rosold to the merged company, to the extent that it is not needed 
to serve native load it must be made available to meet its 
obligation to serve other firm wholesale transmission requests. 
i i i . N9n-fipt whg»Unq 
To the extent that the merged company negotiates non-firm 
wheeling transactions with other utilities, rates for such 
service shall be based on an equal three-way sharing of the 
benefits in accordance with trial staff's revised wheeling 
policy. Each party to this rate shall agree to make available to 
the other parties such incremental cost information as is 
reasonably necessary to estimate the total savings to be shared. 
c. Compliance Filing 
As part of its compliance filing, the merged company shall 
file as a tariff each of conditions set forth above. 
D. The Effect on Regulation 
One of the issues set for hearing was the potential for 
impairment of effective regulation. The administrative law judge 
found that both the size of the merged entity as well as the 
number of states in which it would be operating would create very 
difficult interjurisdictional problems. The judge also found 
that there would be "serious difficulties inherent in developing 
and implementing cost allocation principles for inter-divisional 
cost allocations." 174/ 
While admitting that the merger may potentially create some 
additional regulatory burden, the Applicants except to the 
finding that the merger would impair effective regulation. 175/ 
Both the Utah Division of Public Utilities and the Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming strongly except to the Initial Decision and 
urge this Commission to recognize the ability of the seven 
affected states to effectively regulate the multi-jurisdictional 
activities of Pacificorp Oregon. Trial staff argues that it 
would be possible to effectively regulate the merged entity 
174/ 43 FERC at 65,348. 
175/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 83-85. 
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through appropriate rate conditions. 176/ We agree, and find 
that appropriate conditions exist which, if accepted by the 
Applicants, would enable this Commission and the state 
commissions to effectively regulate the merged entity. These 
conditions are discussed below in the section on the effect on 
rates and operating costs. 
The proposed merger would affect Commission jurisdiction in 
two principal ways. 177/ First, because the merged entity would 
be incorporated in the State of Oregon, this Commission would not 
regulate its securities issuances. 178/ That regulatory function 
would vest in the Oregon Commission. 179/ Second, and more 
importantly for purposes of our consideration, PP&L and UP&L 
would cease to be separate legal or jurisdictional entities. 
Because of the divisional structure that Pacificorp has elected 
to pursue, the jurisdictional public utility would be the merged 
company — not the operating divisions. As noted in the 
testimony of staff witness, Jonathan L. Siems: 
After the merger, it appears that the pricing 
of power transfer transactions between the 
two companies — which would become two 
"divisions" of one company — may no longer 
be directly governed by existing FERC rate 
schedules, because such transactions 
technically will be internal to the merged 
company. 180/ 
While this Commission would continue to regulate the wholesale 
rates of Pacificorp Oregon, intra-company transactions by and 
176/ Trial Staff Brief on Exceptions, pp. 13-25. 
177/ We note that the merger application has been approved 
by each of the seven states in which Pacificorp Oregon 
would be conducting business. The state commissions 
have attached various allocation and rate conditions to 
their approval. These include the Applicants' 
agreement not to seek retail rate increases for a 
certain period of time following the merger, and their 
agreement to reduce certain retail rates. The Utah 
Public Service Commission, while having approved the 
merger, has not yet issued an order explaining its 
rationale or describing any conditions it may attach to 
its approval. 
178/ 16 U.S.C. § 824c(f) (1982). 
179/ See Exhibit 3 at 20. 
180 Ex. 102 at 8. 
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between the two divisions would no longer be "sales for resale11 
and therefore will not be subject to a rate schedule or tariff on 
file with this Commission. 181/ 
In its Brief on Exceptions, the Utah Division of Public 
Utilities characterizes the proposed divisional organization as 
maintaining the current Federal/state regulatory 
relationship. 182/ However, pre-merger, Commission 
determinations regarding rates for transactions between UP&L and 
PP&L would preempt contrary state determinations. 183/ Following 
the merger, wholesale rate determinations by this Commission 
based upon a particular assignment or allocation of costs between 
the two divisions would not preempt a state retail rate 
determination based upon a contrary assignment or allocation. 
The seven affected states would be free to adopt different (and 
potentially inconsistent) cost allocation schemes. As correctly 
noted by the Utah Division of Public Utilities: 
[A] risk exists that jurisdictions may 
allocate costs on a different basis, and that 
100 percent of the costs may not be 
recovered. . . . Each jurisdiction will have 
the right to allocate costs, and the utility 
will continue to have a risk that assets will 
go unrecovered. 184/ 
We find this to be a risk that the Applicants have knowingly 
assumed in proposing a divisional operating structure and we do 
not perceive the possibility that Pacificorp Oregon may under-
recover its costs in retail proceedings as impairing the 
effectiveness of Federal regulation. 
Our concern as a regulatory body is that Pacificorp Oregon 
not be permitted to use its proposed divisional structure as a 
mechanism for over-recovery of wholesale costs. Consequently, we 
intend to preserve the Applicants1 obligation in future rate 
cases to give full and complete access to the books and records 
181/ 16 U.S.C. 824(d) (1982). We note that if Pacificorp had 
chosen to reorganize as a holding company and retained PP&L 
and UP&L as operating subsidiaries, PP&L and UP&L would have 
remained jurisdictional entities and transactions between 
the two operating subsidiaries would have remained 
jurisdictional before this Commission. 
182/ Utah Division of Public Utilities Brief on Exceptions at 13. 
183/ Nantahala Power & Light Company v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 
(1986). 
184/ Utah Division of Public Utilities Brief on Exceptions at 19. 
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of each of its divisions. Furthermore, we will order Pacificorp 
Oregon to maintain a clearly defined audit trail for transactions 
between divisions. 
The judge found that: 
Regulators will virtually be at the mercy of 
the merged company in determining inter-
company cost allocations and thus in 
measuring earnings levels and determining 
rates. (Ex. 296 at 3). Moreover, 
Applicants1 offered "audit trails11 will not 
solve these problems. Contrary to the 
suggestion of Applicants, audit trails might 
permit the unraveling of the merged company's 
preferred allocation method, but they will 
not necessarily allow the use of alternative 
methods preferred by state or federal 
regulators. Adequate records might simply be 
unavailable to implement any such alternative 
methodology. 185/ 
We disagree. Ultimately, state and Federal regulatory 
commissions have to approve the rates that Pacificorp can charge, 
respectively, to retail and wholesale ratepayers. To the extent 
that Pacificorp1s proposed allocation methodology is unsupported, 
flawed, or otherwise unacceptable, this Commission may deny the 
recovery of costs. Therefore, failure to maintain and provide an 
adequate audit trail for this Commission to "unravel" 
intracompany allocations would put the merged entity at further 
risk of recovering less than 100 percent of its costs of 
providing service. We believe this is an adequate safeguard 
against Pacificorp Oregon submitting less than complete cost of 
service data to support interdivisional allocations of costs and 
revenues. 
Finally, as noted above, section 203(b) provides that "the 
Commission may from time to time for good cause shown make such 
orders supplemental to any order made under this section as it 
may find necessary or appropriate.11 186/ Thus, we view our 
conditioning authority under section 203(b) as continuing in 
nature. Therefore, should an interested party come before the 
Commission in the future with a showing that the merged entity 
operating in such a manner as to impair the effectiveness of 
regulation, or if the Commission svi^  sponte reached this 
conclusion, we retain the statutory authority to further 
155/ 43 FERC at 65,350-51. 
186/ 16 U.S.C. § 824b(b) (1982). 
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condition the merger so as to render it consistent with the 
public interest, 
E. The Effect on Operating Costs and Rate Levels 
In Commonwealth Edison, the Commission stated: 
[I]t is our responsibility under the Federal 
Power Act in determining whether a merger is 
consistent with the public interest to 
consider what effect the fact of merger would 
have on rate levels or on state regulation of 
retail rate design. 187/ 
Thus, in our order setting the merger application for hearing, we 
required that the Applicants submit: 
data comparing the operating costs of each 
company, as well as whether the Applicants 
intend to file future wholesale rates on a 
consolidated or divisional basis. 188/ 
The presiding judge faulted the Applicants for providing 
inadequate cost support to enable the Commission to properly 
compare the operating costs of each company before the merger 
with the operating costs of the combined entity after the merger. 
In so doing, the judge misconstrued the nature of our inquiry 
with regard to rates under section 203 vis a vis that conducted 
in the course of proceedings under sections 205 and 206. 
Under section 203, our focus with regard to rates is upon 
whether the proposed combination is "likely to effect unnecessary 
rate increases or inhibit possible rate reductions.11 190/ In 
setting the merger application for hearing, it was not our 
intention to require comprehensive cost of service documentation 
or to develop wholesale rates in the context of a proceeding 
under section 203. Instead, we anticipated a more generalized 
inquiry and cross-examination regarding the types of savings and 
efficiencies that might be achieved through merger. In the event 
that the merger application were to be finally consummated, a 
rate proceeding under section 205 may then be held to determine 
187/ 36 FPC at 938. 
188/ 41 FERC at 61,754. 
189/ 43 FERC at 65,334. 
190/ 36 FPC at 933, citing Western Massachusetts Electric Co., 2 
FPC 345 (1942), and Northwestern Electric Co., 5 FPC 312 
(1946). 
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just and reasonable rates for the provision of wholesale electric 
service by the newly-merged entity. As we will discuss more 
fully below, given the magnitude of merger-related cost savings 
projected by the Applicants, we intend to establish rate 
procedures to ensure that the merger-related savings are 
translated into lower wholesale rates as quickly as possible. 
We recognize that deferring the actual determination of 
wholesale rate levels to a subsequent rate proceeding injects a 
degree of uncertainty into the merger approval process. That 
uncertainty stems from the fact that the outcome of a rate 
proceeding may affect the desirability of the merger — from the 
perspective of the Applicants as well as other affected parties. 
In our view, some uncertainty is unavoidable if we are to deal 
with merger applications in a timely and efficient manner. We 
recognize that it would be impossible to anticipate every 
possible rate question that may occur as a result of this merger. 
However, to the extent possible, we will provide direction and 
guidance regarding the likely disposition of identifiable rate 
issues that may result from the merger (e.g.. divisional pricing 
versus single system or rolled-in pricing) as well as a workable 
framework for the administration of future rate proceedings. 
1. Merger Benefits 
The Initial Decision discusses the effect on operating costs 
and rate levels from the standpoint of the savings or merger 
benefits cited by the Applicants in support of the proposed 
merger. We find that in rejecting most of the Applicants1 
claimed merger benefits, the judge's standard of review was 
overly rigid. He concluded that: 
• . • the evidence demonstrates that nearly 
all of the possible benefits indicated by 
Applicants are either speculative, attainable 
absent the merger, or pecuniary benefits 
(i.e. gained by Applicants at the expense of 
others such that the public interest is not 
affected). 191/ 
This conclusion should be viewed, however, in the context of 
the judge1s finding that the Commission lacks the authority to 
condition the merger in such a manner sufficient to alleviate the 
likely anticompetitive effects. Since we are imposing conditions 
designed to restrain the merged company's market power and avoid 
anticompetitive effects that may result from the merger, the 
claimed benefits should be evaluated in the context of those 
restraints. 
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In evaluating the effect of the merger on operating costs 
and rate levels, it is necessary to consider all of the benefits 
(and costs) likely to result. The possibility of achieving a 
particular benefit through a contractual arrangement does noc 
diminish the cost savings associated with that benefit. The 
relevant question is whether the benefits of a merger will 
outweigh its costs such that the current and future cost of 
providing electric service will be less. 
The Applicants have projected merger-related savings of 
approximately $48 million in 1988 increasing to $158 million in 
1992. They estimate that total benefits for the five-year period 
following the merger will exceed $505 million. 192/ Even if we 
discount certain claims by the Applicants that appear overly 
speculative or extend too far into the future to be meaningful, 
we are still left with substantial savings that may be achieved 
as a result of merger. The Applicants have projected that 
significant cost reductions will flow from the elimination or 
consolidation of duplicative functions when the two companies are 
combined. 193/ More importantly, in the area of power supply 
costs the Applicants project that considerable savings are 
possible due to the diversity in peak demands on the two systems. 
Because the UP&L system peaks in summer and the PP&L system peaks 
in the winter, the combined system can be dispatched more 
efficiently and reserve requirements for the combined entity will 
be reduced. 194/ The Applicants estimate that the reduced 
capacity requirements will enable Pacificorp Oregon to defer 
construction of new capacity until approximately 1997 or 
1998. 195/ Furthermore, the merger will provide a better mix of 
generating resources and power supply options which will enable 
Pacificorp Oregon to take advantage of fuel cost diversities and 
to displace higher cost purchased power expenses. 196/ 
We agree with various intervenors that a major portion of 
the savings claimed from combining administrative functions have 
not been substantiated. 197/ However, we are convinced, as trial 
staff argues, that the probable merger benefits nonetheless add 
192/ Ex. 4, Sch. 3. 
193/ Ex. 3 at 10-11. 
194/ Ex. 8 at 19-20; Ex. 9, Schs. 13 and 14; and Ex. 10 at 4-16. 
195/ Ex. 8 at 20-28 and Ex. 9, Schs. 16, 17, and 21. 
196/ Ex. 3 at 9; Ex. 8 at 13; and Ex. 9, Schs. 5-9. 
197/ See, e.g., Nucor Steel Brief Opposing Exceptions at 42-
45. 
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up to substantially more than the costs of the merger. 198/ We 
further agree that the power supply benefits alone would likely 
be greater than the costs of the merger. 199/ 
2. single gystem punnq 
Following the merger, the Applicants have proposed to 
design separate rates for the UP&L Division and the PP&L 
Division. The Applicants have specifically requested that the 
Commission endorse divisional pricing in the present order "at 
least for a reasonable period of time during which the costs of 
the two divisions will tend to converge." 200/ 
However, as correctly noted by trial staff and certain 
intervenors, Commission precedent clearly supports single system 
pricing except in certain limited situations. 201/ As Sierra 
Pacific and Nevada Power Company point out: 
The principal reason behind adoption of 
[rolled-in costing] is that an integrated 
system is designed to achieve maximum 
efficiency and reliability at a minimum cost 
on a system wide basis. Implicit in this 
theory is the assumption that all customers 
. . . receive the benefits that are inherent 
in such an integrated system. 202/ 
For purposes of wholesale ratemaking, the presumption is that 
single system pricing is appropriate unless the utility can 
demonstrate a valid basis for departing from that presumption. 
We note further that single system pricing would solve many of 
the problems identified by the judge with regard to the 
Applicants' divisional pricing proposal. 203/ 
198/ Trial staff Brief on Exceptions at 12. 
199/ !&• 
200/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 71. 
201/ See, e.g.. Trial staff Brief on Exceptions at 22, 
citing Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. FERC, 793 F.2d 1086 
(9th Cir. 1986) ; Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power 
Company Brief Opposing Exceptions at 11-12. 
202/ Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company Brief Opposing 
Exceptions at 12, quoting Otter Tail Power Co., Opinion 
No. 93, 12 FERC J 61,169 at 61,420 (1980). 
203/ Trial Staff Brief on Exceptions at 22. 
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Obviously, when a merger is proposed between utilities with 
disparate costs, single system pricing may work to the advantage 
of ratepayers of one utility and to the disadvantage of 
ratepayers of the other utility. In evaluating whether a 
proposed merger is consistent with the public interest, the 
Commission's focus must be upon the overall or net impact upon 
rates. To insist upon immediate single system pricing might 
discourage certain mergers where efficiency gains are possible, 
thereby depriving ratepayers of substantial savings. 
Furthermore, there may be other valid reasons to allow some 
flexibility for purposes of pricing generation and transmission 
service (e.g., to more accurately reflect regional differences in 
the cost of production). Therefore, the Commission is willing to 
countenance an initial level of rate disparity between divisions 
to permit Pacificorp Oregon to gain some experience operating as 
a merged entity, to ameliorate possible rate shock to existing 
wholesale PP&L ratepayers, and to allow the system time to become 
more fully integrated. 
In support of the merger, the Applicants have stated that 
Pacificorp Oregon will be operated as a single integrated system. 
After the merger, the companies1 generation 
and transmission resources will be planned 
and operated on a single-utility basis (Ex. 
8, pp. 28-30; Ex. 207, p. 45). The merger 
•will create an even more integrated system 
than before,• which will be fully integrated, 
and fwill operate in an interconnected and 
coordinated fashion1 (Ex. 8, p. 30). The 
consolidation will allow the Merged Company 
to dispatch its most economic generating 
units (Ex. 8, p. 31). 204/ 
Furthermore, the Applicants have stated that Pacificorp Oregon 
will move naturally towards single system pricing within the next 
fifteen to twenty years. 205/ However, we can find no evidence 
in the record that would support fifteen to twenty years as a 
reasonable period of time to phase in single system pricing. 2_c-l 
Indeed, the only basis cited by Applicants in support of their 
204/ Applicants Initial Brief at 7. 
205/ Tr. 1366, 1369. 
206/ Note that the term "phase-in" does not connote any deferr 
revenue recovery and does not involve FASB 92 considerate: 
regarding the appropriate phase-in period. See Arkansas 
Power & Light Company, 41 FERC f 61,034 (1987) and Notice 
Inquiry, Accounting for Phase-In Plans, 53 Fed. Reg. 2*, 
(1988) . 
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proposed divisional pricing concept is that "uniform prices would 
result in substantial price increases for Pacific customers, 
perhaps in the order of 15 to 20%." 207/ We are unwilling to 
adopt a particular phase-in period based upon the record 
developed in a proceeding under section 203. Consequently, we 
will order Pacificorp Oregon to phase in single system pricing 
and set the determination of a reasonable phase-in period for 
hearing as part of the first rate proceeding ordered following 
the merger. 
We wish #to stress that allowing divisional pricing for 
Pacificorp Oregon is an exception to our general policy of 
requiring rolled-in pricing of generation and transmission and we 
are in no way overruling that general policy. Our approval of 
the proposed merger is not intended to encourage divisional 
reorganizations of existing utilities in order to assign specific 
generation or transmission resources to specific customers. 
Our willingness to accept divisional pricing for a limited period 
of time is expressly contingent upon Pacificorp Oregon submitting 
detailed cost support for the allocation of costs and revenues 
between the two divisions in the upcoming rate proceedings as 
ordered below. 
3. Interiurisdictional/Interdivisional Allocation 
Process 
As noted by the presiding judge, the consensus process 
proposed by Applicants to implement interdivisional and 
interjurisdictional cost allocations is seriously flawed. The 
Applicants have admitted that "interjurisdictional and 
intercompany allocations are among the most complex and 
controversial areas of utility regulation," and it "may well take 
several years of discussions and actual experience before all 
affected parties understand the issues involved and consensus 
emerges regarding appropriate cost allocation for the 
2 07/ Applicants Brief Opposing Exceptions at 15. As proof of 
this statement, the Applicants derived rates for each 
division as well as for the combined post-merger entity by 
dividing calendar year 1987 revenues by calendar year 1987 
MWH sales. fid., Appendix A.) However, this is not 
enlightening because it assumes that the revenues of the 
combined single entity will be equal to the sum of the 
revenues collected by UP&L and PP&L before the merger. In 
light of the substantial cost savings the Applicants have 
proffered in support of the merger application, there is no 
reason to assume that either revenues or sales from 1937 
accurately reflect what revenue or sales figures will be fc: 
the merged entity. 
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consolidated entity." 208/ While we are sympathetic to the 
Applicants' desire for uniformity and consistency between the 
various jurisdictions, we cannot allow the consensus process to 
delay the implementation of lower wholesale rates that fully 
reflect the benefits of the merger. The Applicants have stated 
that: 
The objective is to ensure, as we have with 
our existing allocation system, that there is 
an opportunity for 100 percent cost 
collection, and the objective here would be 
that we are not giving away more than 100 
percent of the merger benefits. 209/ 
In that regard, we note that the Applicants have failed to 
establish that the selective rate reductions and moratoriums 
offered before the various state public utility commissions and 
at this Commission bear any relationship to the ultimate cost the 
merged entity will incur to provide electric service. We have no 
way of knowing if PP&L's current wholesale rates will be cost-
justified after the merger nor do we have any indication that the 
cost of providing service to UP&L customers will decrease by two 
percent after the merger. At best, we can accept the (pre-
merger) rates that Pacificorp Oregon proposes to charge its 
wholesale customers on a temporary or interim basis following the 
merger. This will provide the newly-merged entity time to fully 
prepare cost-of-service studies to support just and reasonable 
wholesale rates. 
4. Fuel ftfljygtment Cjau?e 
Initially, it will be necessary for the new jurisdictional 
entity, Pacificorp Oregon, to file a Notice of Succession in 
accordance with the Commission's regulations in order to take 
over operating control of the jurisdictional facilities of UP&L 
and PP&L — including all rate schedules that are currently on 
file. 210/ As noted by Sierra Pacific, when Pacificorp Oregon, 
as the new jurisdictional entity, adopts UP&L's existing fuel 
adjustment clause, the fuel clause by its own terms can no longer 
reflect the fuel costs and Kilowatthour sales of UP&L, but must 
reflect the total fuel costs and total kilowatthour sales of 
Pacificorp Oregon. 
Consistent with Section 35.14 of the 
Commission's regulations, UP&L's rate 
208/ Ex. 3 at 18; Tr. 1276. 
209/ Tr. 1185. 
2,10/ 18 C.F.R. § 35.16 (1988) 
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schedule provides fuel costs to be calculated 
based on the fuel consumed within the 
"utility's own plants". After the merger, 
generation plants will no longer be owned by 
UP&L and PP&L, but will be owned by the 
merged corporation, Pacificorp. Tr. 1335. 
Hence, per Commission regulations, Pacificorp 
must pass through fuel costs of its 
generation. This interpretation of 
Commission regulations is fully consistent 
with Commission decisions regulating gas 
utilities in which the Commission has 
directed merged companies to calculate gas 
costs as the combined or rolled-in costs of 
the two formerly separate companies. fCitina 
Consolidated Natural Gas SUPDIV Corp., 
Opinion No. 703, 52 FPC 454 (1974) and 
National Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 7 FERC 
1 61,317 (1979).] For the same reasons, the 
purchased power costs flowed through the 
fuel-clause should be calculated on a single 
system basis. 211/ 
Accordingly, from the date the Notice of Succession is accepted 
by the Commission, UP&L's current fuel adjustment clause must 
operate on a total company basis. This will fully protect UP&L's 
existing wholesale ratepayers from possible overcharges, is 
consistent with the Commission's fuel clause regulations, and 
will defer allocation questions until the first full rate 
proceeding ordered following the merger. As part of that 
proceeding, Pacificorp Oregon is free to propose the elimination 
of the fuel adjustment clause and the collection of fuel costs 
through separate base energy rates for each division. 
5. F9fupd| Liability 
where a corporate reorganization or merger generates 
significant cost savings, there is very little incentive for the 
new utility to come forward with new rates that fully reflect 
those savings. Under the Commission's regulations, if the merger 
is approved the surviving entity would be required to file a 
Notice of Succession pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 35.16 (1988). At 
that time, the surviving entity could either seek to continue the 
existing rates or could file a rate change application 
simultaneously with its notice of succession. 212/ In either 
211/ Sierra Pacific and Nevada Power Company Initial Brief at : 
212/ However, if a rate decrease were filed, under section 
205 of the FPA there is no statutory refund obligation. 
(continued...) 
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event, the Commission cannot make a finding under section 203 
that the merger is consistent with the public interest without 
some assurance that the post-merger wholesale rates will not be 
excessive. 213/ In the absence of such assurance, the Commission 
would be in the anomalous situation of approving a merger that 
could result in the collection of substantial excess revenues 
without according any refund protection to the affected wholesale 
customers. We agree with the observation by Sierra Pacific 
witness Smith: 
[A] commitment to a rate filing without 
refund floor is required, otherwise the 
effective date of reduced rate levels that 
properly reflect the cost to serve . . . 
wholesale customers as of the date of the 
merger could be delayed unjustifiably for a 
substantial period of time. 214/ 
Therefore, as we will describe more fully below, we intend 
to condition our approval of the merger under section 203 upon 
Pacificorp Oregon making three separate section 205 rate change 
applications to ensure that the cost savings that have been 
projected in support of the merger are fully reflected in 
wholesale rates. The burden of proof in these applications shall 
be upon Pacificorp Oregon. Furthermore, under the rate 
procedures we intend to establish, Pacificorp Oregon will be 
obligated to make refunds, back to the effective date of each of 
the three rate change applications, that reflect the rate level 
ultimately determined to be just and reasonable. 
6. Rate Conditions 
212/(...continued) 
16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1982). Should it ultimately be 
determined that the proposed rates are unjust and 
unreasonable, a new rate can only be imposed 
prospectively. after the Commission establishes the 
just and reasonable rate to be thereafter observed. 
213/ In a period of declining costs, it is to the utility's 
advantage to understate cost savings and overstate 
proposed rates (or to make no rate change application 
at all and wait until a complaint proceeding is filed 
under section 206 of the FPA). However, we note that 
the recently enacted Regulatory Fairness Act, Pub. L. 
No. 100-473 (1988), provides some refund protection 
where rates are found to be unjust and unreasonable. 
214/ Ex. 298 at 5. 
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In their Initial Brief, the Applicants have included a 
number of conditions 115/ which relate to the effect of the 
merger on rates. With respect to the UP&L Division, the 
Applicants have agreed to reduce wholesale rates by two percent 
and to freeze the fuel adjustment clause at 13 mills, subject to 
refund. The Applicants have also agreed to file a cost-of-
service study for UP&L Division requirements service equivalent 
to Statement BK 216/ within nine months of the effective date of 
the merger, and annually thereafter upon the request of the 
Commission. And, within one year, the Applicants are willing to 
file a cost-of-service study for UP&L Division wheeling service. 
We note that these various cost-of-service filings are 
informational only. That is, the merged company will not file 
for a decrease in rates (beyond the initial two percent 
reduction) until after the informational filing is processed and 
a determination is made that a rate decrease is justified. The 
Applicants claim that: 
[a] full rate filing is necessarily a major 
undertaking under 18 C.F.R. § 35.13 and 
should be required only if a cost of service 
shows a rate decrease to be justified. 217/ 
With regard to the PP&L Division, the Applicants have 
undertaken a general commitment not to increase wholesale rates 
until 1992. The Applicants do not intend to make any filing to 
support the continuation of PP&Lfs current wholesale rates. 213/ 
Trial staff has suggested a procedure under which the 
Commission would (1) accept the Applicants1 offer to cap the 
wholesale rates of the PP&L Division until April 1992, 219/ 
(2) require a complete rate case filing by the UP&L Division for 
both wholesale requirements service as well as wheeling service 
within six months after the merger is approved, and annually 
215/ These conditions have been proposed by the Applicants 
"without conceding either the authority of the Commission t 
impose such conditions or the adequacy of the record to 
justify such conditions." Applicants Initial Brief, 
Appendix B. 
216/ 18 C.F.R. § 35.13(h)(36) (1988). 
217/ Applicants Reply Brief at 15-16. 
218/ Id. at 18. 
219/ The Applicants assert that PP&Lfs rates are already cappo:. 
However, the presiding judge correctly found that only or 
of PP&L's five wholesale rates currently on file is capp:;. 
43 FERC at 65,356. 
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thereafter until 1992, (3) require a concurrent informational 
filing by the PP4L Division, and (4) require the UPiL Division to 
submit a 2% base rate reduction and propose an interim FAC 
allocation procedure within 30 days after the merger is approved. 2_2 
Trial staff also endorsed a proposal by Sierra Pacific witness 
Smith that the first rate filing by the UP&L Division be made 
without a refund floor. 
We have a number of concerns regarding the Applicants1 
unsupported offer to reduce certain wholesale customers1 rates by 
two percent and to freeze the rates of other wholesale customers 
at their current levels for several years. We are particularly 
concerned that the various informational filings proposed by the 
Applicants that are "similar in format" to the cost support 
required in a formal rate application, but which will precede 
such rate applications, are merely devices that will 
unnecessarily delay implementation of lower wholesale rates. And 
while we support the general thrust of trial staff!s proposed 
rate procedures, we feel that a number of modifications are 
necessary to ensure that the merger savings projected by the 
Applicants are translated into lower wholesale rates as quickly 
as possible. Accordingly, we are making our approval of the 
merger expressly contingent upon the filing of three distinct 
rate applications by Pacificorp Oregon. 
The first filing shall be made no later than June 1, 1989, 
and shall include: 
1) functionalized test period cost of service information 
on a total company basis and development of a single system 
requirements rate and a single system firm wheeling rate; 
2) explanation and cost support (including all workpapers) 
for the allocation of total company revenues and expenses to 
the UPiL Division and the PP&L Division; 
3) A UP&L Division rate filing in accordance with 13 C.F.R. 
S 35.13 including full Period I and Period II cost of 
service statements to support proposed requirements rates 
and proposed firm wheeling rates to become effective on June 
1, 1989; 
4) A PP&L Division rate filing in accordance with 18 C.F.R. 
§ 35.13 including Period I and Period II cost of service 
statements to support proposed requirements rates and 
220/ Trial staff Initial Brief at 54-74; Trial staff Reply 
Brief at 13-20. 
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proposed firm wheeling rates to become effective on June 1, 
1989; 221/ 
5) A proposal to either (a) continue the single system fuel 
adjustment clause (effective upon Pacificorp Oregon's 
succession to UP&L's rate schedules) and extend its 
applicability to the PP&L Division wholesale customers or 
(b) eliminate the fuel adjustment clause altogether i.e.. 
build all such costs into base rates; and 
6) A plan for phasing out divisional pricing over a 
reasonable period of time. 
Pacificorp Oregon shall utilize the same test periods for all of 
the filings discussed above. We recognize that this type of 
simultaneous cost of service presentation will involve a 
substantial filing burden for the new company. However, we feel 
that this process is necessary for the Commission to 
intelligently evaluate the inter-divisional cost allocation 
process and will help ensure that Pacificorp neither under-
recovers nor over-recovers the cost of providing wholesale 
service. 
The total company filing will provide a "shadow rate" which 
will enable the Commission to track the difference between 
divisional pricing and single system pricing, to identify the 
degree to which one division may be "subsidizing" the operations 
of the other division, and to evaluate the reasonableness of the 
time period proposed to phase in single system pricing. A single 
system rate will also provide a good benchmark against which 
retail jurisdictions may evaluate retail rate proposals by the 
merged entity. We wish to stress, however, that any allocation 
methodology that is adopted by the Commission for allocating 
costs between the two divisions will be without prejudice to 
contrary allocations or assignments of cost by retail regulatory 
commissions. 
The second filing shall be made so as to become effective, 
subject to refund, on June 1, 1991. It shall be similar in 
format to the filing described above and shall include the 
development of a single system rate for comparison purposes, a 
UP&L Division rate change application, and a PP&L Division rate 
change application. Again, the same test period must be used to 
support each application as well as the single system comparison 
rate. 
2 21/ Pacificorp Oregon may propose rates for either division that 
are designed to recover less than the fully allocated cost 
of service. This will enable Pacificorp Oregon to "freeze'1 
PP&L rates at their current level so long as those rates car. 
be cost-justified. 
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The third filing shall be made so as to become effective, 
subject to refund, on June 1, 1993. It is hoped that the merged 
entity will be fully integrated by this date and that the 
proposed rate will be a single system rate. However, if 
divisional pricing is to be continued beyond June 1# 1993, this 
filing shall be in the same format required for the first two 
filings. Pacificorp Oregon is free to make other rate change 
applications within the first five years of merged operations, 
but we will require any such filings to be made for both 
divisions simultaneously. 
All divisional rate applications filed by Pacificorp Oregon 
within the first five years after the merger shall be made under 
section 205. Pacificorp Oregon must refund the difference 
between the rate that is accepted for filing and the rate that is 
ultimately determined to be just and reasonable back to the 
effective date of each rate application filed within the first 
five years after the merger. Our intention is to ensure, to the 
extent possible, that the cost of service filings fully reflect 
the benefits and cost savings that the Applicants have projected 
for the first five years of merged operations. Refund 
obligations associated with any rate filings made after June 1, 
1993 shall be in accordance with Commission regulations in effect 
at that time. However, so long as Pacificorp Oregon proposes 
divisional pricing, rate applications for each division shall be 
made simultaneously and shall be based upon the same twelve-month 
test period. 
We find that absent such rate conditions, the instant merger 
would not be consistent with the public interest. We again note 
our ability to subsequently condition the merger, if necessary. 
F. Noncontiguous Systems 
CREDA argues that the proposed merger must be rejected as 
contrary to the general public policy against mergers of 
noninterconnected and noncontiguous systems. 222/ Citing 
Commonwealth and Western Light & Telephone. Co. (Western Light), 
CREDA argues that Commission precedent requires merging utilities 
to either interconnect or divest themselves of any noncontiguous 
portions of their systems. Thus, CREDA asserts that unless the 
Commission overrules its precedent on this subject, the 
Commission would at a minimum have to condition approval of this 
merger on a showing that Pacificorp Oregon will either: (1) 
interconnect its Western System with its Eastern system and/or 
the UP&L system; or (2) divest the PP&L western system. 
222/ CREDA Brief Opposing Exceptions at 77. 
223/ 33 FPC 1147 (1965). 
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The cases cited by CREDA rely on the fact that the Federal 
Power Act (containing section 203) was enacted together with 
PUHCA as a single legislative bill. PUHCA prohibits mergers or 
acquisitions by holding companies that do not tend toward the 
economical and efficient development of an integrated public 
utility system. Z2A/ Citing the above legislative history and 
Western Light, the Commission stated in Commonwealth: 
[W]e believe that the basic congressional 
policies as to integrated operation embedded 
in [PUHCA] are applicable considerations in 
passing upon proposals for merger of 
operating companies, and that the burden is 
upon the applicants to demonstrate why 
operation of noncontiguous electric 
territories or combined gas and electric 
facilities is consistent with the public 
interest. 225/ 
For the reasons set forth below# we overrule Commonwealth 
and Western Light to the extent that they may be interpreted as 
requiring the parties to a merger to either physically 
interconnect their noncontiguous systems or to divest themselves 
of those systems. The requirements of PUHCA, including the 
prohibition against mergers that do not meet the definition of an 
integrated public utility system, apply only to public utility 
holding companies. Neither CREDA, nor the Commission in 
Commonwealth and Western adequately distinguish between operating 
electric utilities that are part of a holding company system and 
those that are not. This distinction is a crucial one, for it 
was the holding company •device1 that was the target of PUHCA. 
PUHCA was enacted in 1935 in response to widespread abuses 
among utility holding companies. 2267 These abuses resulted in 
224/ 15 U.S.C. § 79(a)(29)(A) (1982). S£S n. 80, supra. 
225/ 36 F.P.C. at 943. 
226/ In a message to Congress on March 12, 1935, President 
Roosevelt addressed the legislation being considered by 
Congress to remedy the abuses of the utility holding 
companies. The President stated: 
Except where it is absolutely necessary to 
the continued functioning of a geographically 
integrated operating utility system, the 
utility holding company with its present 
powers must go. If we could remake our 
(continued...) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Docket No. EC88-2-000 -64-
the loss of millions of dollars to the investing public. 227/ By 
its terms, PUHCA is limited in its application to public-utility 
holding companies and their affiliates* The concern that the 
226/(...continued) 
financial history in light of experience, 
certainly we would have none of this holding-
company business. It is a device which does 
not belong to our American traditions of law 
and business. . . . [I]t offers too well-
demonstrated temptation to and facility for 
abuse to be tolerated as a recognized 
business institution. That temptation and 
that facility are inherent in its very 
nature. S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st 
Sess. at 3 (1935), (setting forth the text of 
the President's message sent to Congress on 
March 12, 1935, transmitting a report on 
public-utility holding companies prepared by 
the National Power Policy Committee). 
227/ In a statement to Congress in 1982, the precarious 
financial position of the holding companies prior to 
the enactment of PUHCA was summarized by the Chairman 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission: 
As a result of the highly-leveraged capital 
structures, small percentage increases in the 
earnings of the underlying operating 
companies were phenomenally magnified at the 
level of the top holding company's most 
junior equity securities. . . . Of course, 
this leverage also worked in reverse so that 
even the relatively small decreases in 
earnings of the operating companies during 
the early 1930's had a significant impact on 
the top-heavy structure of holding company 
debt and preferred securities. • • • 
The investing public suffered losses of 
millions of dollars. The complex capital 
structures of these holding company systems, 
together with the lack of uniform accounting 
standards, also afforded many opportunities 
to direct profits cr losses through 
intercompany channels. Public Utility 
Holding Company Act Amendments, Hearings on 
S.1869, S.1871 and S.1977 before the Subcomm. 
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 2d 
Sess. 369-370 (1982). 
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holding company device be abolished, "except where it is 
absolutely necessary to the continued functioning of a 
geographically integrated operating utility system11, is embodied 
in section 11(b)(1) of PUHCA, 221/ which requires the 
simplification of holding company systems by limiting them to a 
single integrated public-utility system. Similarly, section 
10(c)(2) prohibits mergers or acquisitions with or by a holding 
company if such acquisition does not tend toward the economical 
and efficient development of an integrated public-utility system. 2_2j 
Relying on Commonwealth and Western Light. CREDA insists 
that the Commission apply a strict "interconnect or divest" rule 
to this merger. Thus, they are arguing that the single 
integrated public utility system concept as set forth in PUHCA is 
fundamental to our analysis of whether a merger not involving a 
holding company is consistent with the public interest pursuant 
to section 203 of the FPA. Implicit in this argument is the 
assumption that the difference between a holding company system 
and an operating company is one of mere formality, and not one of 
substance. 
However, as noted, PUHCA specifically targeted the holding 
company device and the evils attendant thereto. In fact, 
Congress recognized a clear distinction between a holding company 
and an operating company, and expressly contemplated that various 
operating units could be merged into a single operating company 
so long as it did not employ the holding company device. "All 
the advantages of large-scale operation and centralized financing 
claimed for present-day holding companies can be obtained when a 
holding company holds a single integrated system of operating 
companies or when a number of operating units are merged into the 
legal unit of a single large operating company." 220/ 
Accordingly, we need not determine whether a proposed merger 
will result in an "integrated public utility system" as defined 
in PUHCA. Similarly, we need not apply a strict rule requiring 
either the interconnection or divestiture of noncontiguous 
systems. While we recognize that the extent to which the systems 
will be integrated is relevant to our inquiry under section 203, 
our focus under the FPA is more appropriately upon the merged 
228/ 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(l) (1982). 
2 29/ 15 U.S.C. § 79j(c)(2) (1982). 
2 3 0/ S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. at 12 (emphasis 
added). 
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entity's ability to provide economical and reliable service to 
the public. 231/ 
As noted, the FPA was enacted together with PUHCA. While 
PUHCA required that holding companies be dismembered and 
reconstituted along regional lines, one of the Commission's 
responsibilities under the FPA is to oversee the realignment of 
electric utility operating companies following the breakup of the 
holding companies. 232/ The Senate Report on the Public Utility 
Act of 1935 states: "This section [203] • . . complements title 
I of the bill [PUHCA] by directing the [Commission] to prevent 
transfers or consolidations of property which would impair the 
ability of public utilities to render adequate 
gervjgg- . . •" 222/ 
231/ As we stated in the order setting this matter for 
hearing, "we will permit the parties to address the 
issue of whether the merged companies will be capable 
of being operated economically and efficiently as a 
single entity. We will also set for hearing the issue 
of the impact on the public interest of the merged 
entity not operating as a single entity to the extent 
such is found to be the case." 41 FERC at 61,755. We 
adopted the same approach in the order setting for 
hearing the merger application in Tucson Electric Power 
CO., it ai.r 44 FERC J 61,441 (1988). 
232/ In testimony before Congress, the Commission's 
Solicitor - one of the drafters of the legislation that 
was to become the Federal Power Act - stated: 
[T]he provision . . . with reference to 
consolidation is very important when 
considered in connection with title I [PUHCA] 
of this bill. . . . To have legislation of 
this kind enacted at the same time 
legislation of the character carried in title 
I is enacted is important, because whatever 
form title I takes, there is going to be a 
realignment in this industry and steps should 
be taken now to protect the public against an 
uneconomic realignrent. Hearings before the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
House of Representatives (House Hearings), p. 
250 (emphasis added). 
233/ S. Report No. 621, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 50 (1935) 
(emphasis added). Similarly, the Commission's 
Solicitor stated: 
(continued... ) 
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Section 202 of the FPA provides, inter alia, that f,[f]or the 
purpose of assuring an abundant supply of electric energy 
throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy 
and with rejard to the proper utilization and conservation of 
natural resources", the Commission is to encourage the voluntary 
interconnection and coordination of facilities in the public 
interest. 234/ Similarly, the Commission is given the authority 
under section 203(b) to grant approval of proposed mergers and 
consolidations upon terms and conditions that it finds "necessary 
or appropriate to secure the maintenance of adequate service and 
the coordination in the public interest of facilities" that are 
subject to its jurisdiction. 
Thus, it is apparent that the appropriate focus under 
section 203 is on whether a proposed merger will impair the 
ability of the utility to render adequate service, and on whether 
it will result in an uneconomic realignment of electric operating 
facilities. The degree to which the merged entity will be 
comprised of interconnected and contiguous systems is relevant to 
the extent that it bears on the ability of the merged entity to 
capture economies of scale and to provide economical and reliable 
service. As the Commission recognized in Commonwealth, "[t]he 
touchstone of successful operation in todayfs electric power 
industry is the coordination of operating facilities to achieve 
the full economies of scale made possible by advancing 
technology." 23 5/ 
In this case, the Applicants accept the judge's finding that 
PP&Lfs two separate systems (its Western and Eastern systems) are 
not physically interconnected and that PP&L relies on contract 
rights to operate on a single utility basis. 236/ Similarly, 
they acknowledge that UP&L's system is not interconnected with 
233/(...continued) 
The Commission is given . . . the duty of 
attempting to bring these systems into 
district and integrated systems, the purpose 
being to provide the best and cheapest 
service that can be provided for the public. 
. . . [I]f that is to be accomplished, then, 
this Commission must have certain 
jurisdiction over facilities and jurisdiction 
over acquisition of property, and 
jurisdiction over securities. House 
Hearings, p. 501 (emphasis added). 
234/ 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1982). 
235/ 36 FPC 927, 930 (emphasis added). 
236/ Applicants Brief on Exceptions at 81. 
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PP&L's Western system; that there is no evidence that such 
systems will become physically interconnected after the merger; 
and that the merged entity's combined electric systems would 
constitute 19 integrated service areas separated by transmission 
constraints. 237/ The Applicants argue, however, that these 
facts are irrelevant to a determination of whether the merged 
company will operate economically and reliably as a single 
utility. We disagree, and find that these facts are relevant to 
our analysis. However, as discussed below, we nonetheless find 
that the merger will enhance the ability of the Applicants to 
operate economically and reliably, and will result in an entity 
capable of being operated as a single, coordinated system. 
Because of the geographic diversity of PP&L's service 
territory, operational control of PP&L's present system is 
maintained through its two coordinated control areas. 238/ 
Nonetheless, PP&L operates and plans its generation and 
transmission resources on a single coordinated system basis. 239/ 
After the merger, the merged company's generation and 
transmission resources will also be planned and operated on a 
single-utility basis, thus permitting it to dispatch its most 
economic generating units. 240/ 
UP&L is presently interconnected to PP&L's Eastern system at 
Naughton, Wyoming. "241/ The Applicants plan to ultimately raise 
the transfer capacity between UP&L and PP&L to approximately 53 0 
MW and to construct other transmission facilities in order to 
eliminate transmission limitations east of PP&L's Jim Bridger 
plant and to permit access to lower-cost sources of power. 242/ 
Moreover, PP&L's 1980 Transmission Services Agreement (TSA) 
with Idaho Power provides for the transmission of up to 1600 MW 
of PP&L's Wyoming generation through Idaho Power's system in an 
227/ Id-
238/ Ex. 8 at 4, 6-7; Tr. at 2035. 
239/ Ex. 8 at 4-5. 
240/ Ex. 8 at 28-30. The Applicants maintain that the 
merger will create an even more integrated system that 
will operate in an interconnected and coordinated 
fashion. They also suggest that the merger will result 
in an integrated public utility system as defined in 
PUHCA. However, as discussed above, we need not make 
such a determination. 
241/ Ex. 9, Sch. 3 at 4. 
242/ Ex. 8 at 33-35. 
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east to west direction to PP&L's energy deficient Western system. 
CREDA argues that these contract rights are not equivalent to 
interconnection since the TSA does not permit transfers from west 
to east. 243/ However, the merged company will not require such 
transfers since Western loads exceed Western generation. 2 44/ 
While it is conceivable that west to east transfers may become 
necessary, the Applicants state that they are willing to 
construct a transmission line bypassing Idaho Power's system if 
the Commission determines one is necessary. 
Thus, we find that the merger will enhance the ability of 
UP&L and PP&L to operate economically and reliably, and will 
result in an entity capable of being operated as a single, 
coordinated system. 245/ We will, however, retain continuing 
jurisdiction over the issue of whether it will be necessary at 
some time in the future for the Applicants to construct a 
transmission line bypassing Idaho Power's system in order to 
continue operating economically and reliably as a single, 
coordinated system. 
243/ CREDA Brief Opposing Exceptions at 78-9. CREDA also 
argues that the TSA does not permit transfers of power 
from sources other than PP&L's own generation. Id. 
However, we find that this does not represent a 
significant limitation. Moreover, if it proves to be a 
significant limitation in the future, we are retaining 
jurisdiction, as discussed below, to order the 
Applicants to construct a transmission line to 
alleviate this restraint. 
244/ Ex. 207 at 47. 
245/ The Applicants have indicated that they are willing to 
commit that capacity curtailments to interruptible 
customers will not increase in frequency or duration 
over historical levels, regardless of the merged 
company's level of firm, off-system sales. Tr. 2681-
83. While the Applicants are unwilling to make a 
similar commitment with regard to economic 
curtailments, Tr. 3334, there has been no showing that 
an increase in the frequency or duration of such 
curtailments is likely to result from the merger, or 
that an increase in such curtailments would adversely 
affect the overall reliability of the merged company. 
We note that interruptible customers will retain 
whatever 'contract rights after the merger as existed 
before the merger, as well as whatever remedies are 
available pursuant to state retail rate regulation. 
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The Commission orders: 
(A) The Joint Application for Authorization for a Merger 
filed October 5, 1987 is hereby granted subject to the terms and 
conditions set forth in the body of this order* 
(B) Within 60 days of the issuance of this order the 
Applicants shall make a compliance filing with the Commission, 
ircluding a statement either accepting or rejecting the terms and 
conditions set forth above. However, if any request for 
rehearing is pending at the expiration of the 60-day period, the 
filing shall be made within 15 days of the date the Commission 
disposes of the request[s] for rehearing. If within the 
aforementioned period no compliance filing has been made, 
Commission approval shall be deemed denied. 
(C) Docket No. EC88-2-000 is hereby terminated. 
By the Commission. 
( S E A L ) 
Lois D. Cashell, 
Secretary. 
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APPENDIX A 
REVISED WHEELING POLICY 
PROPOSED BY STAFF 
Following is the wheeling policy (Policy) of PacifiCorp 
(Company), and its operating divisions, Pacific Power 6 Light 
Company and Utah Power & Light Company (Utah Power). 
I. PBFIKITIQPS 
As used herein, the following terms shall have the following 
meanings: 
1. "Embedded Costs19 means the actual fixed and variable 
costs associated with transmission facilities calculated in 
accordance with established Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) regulations. 
2. "Firm Wheeling19 means the contractual obligation to 
stand ready to transmit power and energy up to a specified amount 
for a specified term, subject to such interruptions as are agreed 
to between the contracting parties to maintain system 
reliability. 
3. "Integrated Service Area99 means a geographic area of the 
Company's system within which it is generally unconstrained in 
its ability to respond to requests to transmit power in the 
quantities that can be reasonably expected. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX A 
4. "Non-Firm Wheeling91 means transmission service that is 
interruptible at the sole discretion of the Company, or 
interruptible for any reason other than system reliability, as 
agreed to between the contracting parties. 
5. "Opportunity Costs19 of a wheeling transaction means the 
economic benefits to the Company and its customers of alternative 
uses of transmission facilities which must be foregone to- make 
the transaction. 
6. "Point of Delivery" means the point at which power 
wheeled by the Company is received by another utility. 
7. "Point of Replacement" means the point at which the 
Company takes delivery of power to be wheeled for another 
utility. 
8. "Source" means the Mona Substation or any facility that 
generates electricity that is located within an Integrated 
Service Area. 
9. "Transmission Dependent Utilities" means those Utilities 
that are dependent on the Company for transmission access to 
their loads or resources, and includes Deseret Generation and 
Transmission Co-operative, Utah Associated Municipal Power 
Systems, Inc. and its present members, and the present members of 
the Utah Municipal Power Association. 
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10. "Utility" means any public or private entity that is 
lawfully engaged in the business of selling electricity at 
wholesale or retail. 
II. EXISTING CPPTRACTS 
All transmission contracts to which Utah Power or Pacific 
Power 6 Light Company were parties as of the effective date of 
this Policy shall be honored by the Company for their remaining 
term. 
III. FIRM WHKLIWg WTHIM AH INTEGRATED SERVICE AREA 
When both the Source and Point of Delivery are within one of 
its Integrated Service Areas, the Company will provide Firm 
Wheeling service for a requesting Utility as a matter of course 
unless the amount of power to be wheeled exceeds the engineering 
limitations of the Company's system. 
The rate for Firm Wheeling service provided pursuant to this 
Part III will be designed to recover an allocated portion of 
either system embedded cost or an allocated portion of the 
embedded cost of the facilities used to provide the requested 
service. The party requesting service shall not be required to 
agree, as a condition for receiving service, to the Company's 
method of allocating such costs. 
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To ths extant that additions to tha Company's transmission 
facilities are necessary to provide Firm Wheeling within an 
Integrated Service Area, and are technically feasible, the 
Company will construct such additions if sufficient lead time is 
provided and a contract term is agreed upon that is adequate to 
economically support the facilities required. 
IV. FIRM WHEELING SERVICE INTO, OUT 0Ff OR THROUGH 
AW INTEGRATED SERVICE AREA 
A. Determination or Ability to Provide Service. 
When either or both the Point of Replacement or Delivery are 
not internal to a single Integrated Service Area, the Company 
will provide Fin Wheeling service to a requesting Utility unless 
the Company determines that provision of the requested service 
would impair its ability to render firm service to native load 
customers, would preclude its ability to meet obligations under 
previously executed wheeling and bulk power contracts, or would 
otherwise be impractical or impermissible for reasons beyond the 
Company's control. This determination will be based upon a 
reasonable, case-specific evaluation of the following factors 
only: 
1. The duration of the requested service; 
2. Whether new facilities would have to be constructed ir. 
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order to provide the requested service over the 
Company's facilities; 
3. Whether other Utilities desire the same transmission 
services; 
4. Whether the provisions of transmission contracts with 
other Utilities permit the requested service; 
5. Whether the intentions of the Utility requesting 
service are lawful (for example would there be a 
violation of laws related to a certificated area); 
6. The degree of firmness of the requested service; 
7. The service priority of the requested service; 
8. The system impacts of the requested service; 
9. To the extent the requested service involves the 
control area of another Utility, whether that other 
Utility will cooperate in providing the service; 
10. Whether the Utility requesting the service is a 
scheduling Utility; 
11. Current laws and regulations as they apply to the 
Company and its competitors. 
B. Rates for Service. 
The rates for Firm Wheeling service provided pursuant to 
Paragraph IV.A. will be designed to recover an allocated portion 
of embedded system costs, together with Opportunity Costs, if 
any, incurred as a result of providing the service. The 
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Opportunity Cost rate component will be based upon the following 
principles: 
1. The Company may base its quantification of Opportunity 
Costs on the incremental changes to the Company*s costs 
and revenues caused by commitment of Company 
transmission facilities to the provision of Firm 
Wheeling service. 
2. The Company's quantification of Opportunity Costs will 
not include lost benefits associated with the loss of 
the sale of firm power by the Company that is displaced 
by the power being transferred pursuant to this Policy. 
3. The amount by which the Opportunity Cost based rate 
exceeds the underlying Embedded Cost based rate shall 
not exceed the unit cost of eliminating the 
transmission capacity constraint or constraints giving 
rise to the Opportunity Costs, giving due regard to the 
estimated present value of costs and revenues 
associated with such additional capacity. As part of 
this rate development process, the Company will examine 
the technical feasibility and public interest benefits 
of constructing transmission capacity in lieu of 
proposing an Opportunity Cost based rate. 
4. At the option of the Utility requesting the service, 
exercised at the time of entering into a contract, 
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Opportunity Costa will ba based upon either projected 
or experienced operating conditions and wholesale 
marketing opportunities. 
c. Regulatory Approvalsi 
If the Utility requesting wheeling service agrees in 
principle to the appropriateness of including an Opportunity Cost 
component in the Firm Wheeling rate, but tha Company and the 
Utility requesting service are unable to reach agreement as to 
the appropriate level or methodology of such a component, tha 
Company shall provide the requested service and unilaterally file 
a proposed rate including an Opportunity Cost component with the 
FERC, subject to refund. 
D. RreiprrcitYi 
A Utility requesting firm wheeling service under this part 
may not unreasonably deny the Company comparable service over 
comparable facilities controlled by tha requesting Utility. 
«. othtr Rtrtrirtloni 
The Company shall not withhold transmission capacity in 
order to affect a purchase and resale of bulk power for which 
firm transmission is requested. 
V. USE OF FACILITIES CHARGES 
To the extent that providing Firm Wheeling services requires 
the installation of facilities that are not generally useful to 
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tha Company in providing trarsmission sarvicas, tha Company may 
requira tha paymant of a usa of facilities charga or contribution 
in aid of construction to recover costs associated with the 
installation of such facilities. 
VI. ANCILLARY SERVICES 
To the extent a request for Firm Wheeling service requires 
the provision of generating reserves by the Company, or load 
following services, which the Company is able to provide, or if 
transmission losses are not otherwise provided, the Company will 
attempt to negotiate an appropriate charge for such ancillary 
services with the requesting Utility. If the parties are unable 
to agree on an appropriate charge, the services will be provided 
and the Company will unilaterally file a proposed charge with the 
FERC, subject to refund. 
VII. REQUESTS FOR SERVICE AHP TOR IMFQRHATIQH 
Requests for Firm wheeling service should be made in writing 
to the Company. The Company will respond to written requests for 
wheeling services in writing in a reasonable period of time. In 
cases where the Company is not prepared to provide the requested 
service, an explanation of the factors underlying the Company's 
decision will be provided. 
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The Company will promptly respond to reasonable oral and 
written requests by Utilities for information concerning the 
price and availability of Firm and Non-Firm wheeling services. 
Based on the requesting Utility's representations as to the 
nature of the services required, the Company will make a good 
faith effort to accurately estimate such price and capacity 
information for the use of potential transmission service 
customers; however, such estimates do not constitute a binding 
commitment as to price or availability of service. 
VIII. PARTICIPATION BY OTHER UTILITIES IN 
TRAWSMISSIQW CQNSTRPCTIQtf 
A. With respect to the construction of transmission 
facilities of voltage levels of 345 kV or higher and subject to 
applicable state regulatory approval, the Company will afford 
other Utilities the opportunity to participate in the project, 
provided that: (a) the potential participants have a legitimate 
interest or service-related purpose in such participation, 
(b) the joint participation will not unreasonably delay the 
project or render it impractical for the Company as a matter of 
economics or engineering, (c) the potential participants are 
prepared to equitably share in the costs and benefits of the 
project, considering the cost of the project, the value of the 
Company's existing investment in related facilities and the 
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benefits to be derived by each party, and (d) the Utility 
requesting the opportunity to participate has not unreasonably 
denied the Company's participation in comparable projects. 
B. With respect to Transmission Dependent Utilities, the 
Company will agree to joint participation in upgrades, 
improvements or additions to backbone transmission (138 JcV or 
higher), interconnections and substation facilities that are 
internal to an Integrated Service Area, so that such Utilities 
may, subject to applicable state regulatory approval, reasonably 
participate in the project, provided that: (a) the potential 
participants have a legitimate interest or service-related 
purpose in such participation, (b) the joint participation will 
not unreasonably delay the project or render it impractical for 
the Company as a matter of economics or engineering and (c) the 
potential participants are prepared to equitably share in the 
costs and benefits of the project considering the cost of the 
project, the value of the Company's existing investment in 
related facilities and the benefits to be derived by each party. 
C. With respect to Transmission Dependent Utilities, the 
Company shall not unreasonably withhold its consent to requests 
for upgrades, improvements or additions to interconnections, 
transmission and substation facilities located within an 
Integrated Service Area, and subject to applicable state 
regulatory approval, provided that: (a) the requesting Utility 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX A 
arbitar whose decision will ba subjact, vhara raquirad, to review 
by tha FERC as an uncontastad offar of sattlament. 
D. statt Jurig<3irti9n« 
This Paragraph IX shall not apply to Paragraph VIII to the 
extent that a state agency has jurisdiction over complaints 
arising from the Company's alleged failure to adhere to the 
provisions of Paragraph VIII. 
X. NON-FIRM fflgBLDlS 
A. general« 
To the extent it has physical capability to do so, the 
Company will provide Non-Firm Wheeling to signatories of the 
Western Systems Power Pool Agreement or the Intercompany Pool 
Agreement in accordance with the terms of those agreements. In 
addition, the Company will negotiate separate contracts with 
Utilities for Non-Firm Wheeling which provide for an equitable 
sharing of benefits between the Company and other Utilities 
participating in the transactions. 
B. Rattf Baaed on a Three Way Staring Qt Bgntfltt t 
The following principles accomplish an equitable sharing of 
benefits acceptable to the Company. 
1. The rates for Non-Firm Wheeling service under this 
paragraph shall be designed to approximate, to the extant 
feasible, an equal three-way sharing of the savings among the 
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selling, buying, and wheeling parties, with total savings 
calculated based on the difference between the seller's 
incremental cost and the buyer's decremental cost* 
2. Each party to this rate shall agree to make available 
to the other parties such incremental cost information as is 
reasonably necessary to estimate the total savings to be shared. 
XI. WHEEUWg TOR OTAMmre FACILITIES 
The Company will provide transmission service for Qualifying 
Facilities to Utilities in accordance with provisions of 18 
C.F.R. {292.303. 
XII. DfTKRATED SKRVICS AREAS 
A listing of the Company's existing Integrated Service Areas 
is attached hereto. This list is subject to revision based upon 
subsequent changes to the physical capabilities and contractual 
limitations under which the Company operates its transmission 
system. Such revisions are subject to the requirements of 
Paragraph IX.C, Enforcement. 
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INTEGRATED SERVICE AREAS 
1. Tha axlating UP&L aarvica araa in tha Stata of Utah; 
2. Tha axiating UP&L aarvica araa in tha Stata of Idaho; 
3. Tha axiating UP&L aarvica araa in tha Stata of Wyoming; 
4. Tha axiating PP&L aarvica araa in Southam Oragon and 
Northarn California; 
5. Tha axiating PPiL Cooa Bay, Oragon aarvica araa; 
6. Tha axiating PP&L Lincoln City, Oragon aarvica araa; 
7. Tha axiating PP&L Willaaatta Vallay, Oragon aarvica 
araa; 
8. Tha axiating PP&L Cantral Oragon aarvica araa; 
9. Tha axiating PP&L Hood Rivar, Oragon aarvica araa; 
10. Tha axiating PP&L Portland, Oragon aarvica araa; 
11. Tha axiating PP&L Clataop, Oragon aarvica araa; 
12. Tha axiating PP&L Entarpriaa, Oragon aarvica araa; 
13. Tha axiating PP&L Pandlaton, Oragon aarvica araa; 
14. Tha axiating PP&L Walla Walla, Washington aarvica area; 
15. Tha axiating PP&L Yakima, Waahington aarvica araa 
16. Tha axiating PP&L Sandpoint, Idaho aarvica araa; 
17. Tha axiating PP&L Libby, Montana aarvica araa; 
18• Tha axiating PP&L Kalispall, Montana aarvica area; and 
19. Tha axiating PP&L aarvica araa in tha Stata of Wyoming. 
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